Essays on rent-seeking, corruption and informality by Flochel, Thomas Robert Kenneth Lawrence Arthur
Essays on Rent-Seeking, Corruption and Informality
Thomas Robert Kenneth Lawrence Arthur Flochel
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
The University of Edinburgh
2012
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to Maia Giiell and Santiago Sánchez-Páges for their supervision 
and efforts in the last stage of my doctorate, repeatedly reviewing this thesis and 
providing insightful comments. I am indebted to Stéphane Straub for his super­
vision, guidance and collaboration in researching the second chapter of this thesis 
and to Emmanuelle Auriol for her collaboration. I am also personally grateful to 
Maria del Pilar Callizo and Oscar Gavilán from Transparencia Paraguay for mak­
ing the procurement data available and to the whole team there for their support 
during my stay in Asunción. We thank Gani Aldashev, Jean-Marie Baland, Luc 
Behaghel, David Brown, Ernesto Da.1 Bó, Jean-Jacques Dethier, Pierre Dubois, 
Rafael Di Telia, Eduardo Engel, Antonio Estache, Marcel Fafchamps, Rui de 
Figueiredo, Paul Gertler, Maia Giiell, Marc Gurgand, Paul Hare, Tatiana Ko­
rnienko, Sylvie Lambert, Rocco Macchiavello, David Martimort, Jean-Philippe 
Platteau, Sevi Rodríguez Mora, François Salanié, Julio Sánchez Laspina, Wil- 
fried Sand-Zantman, Laura Schechter, Fiona Scott-Morton, Giancarlo Spagnolo, 
Pablo Spiller, Steve Tadelis, Mariano Tommasi, Oliver Williamson and semi­
nar participants at Berkeley, CERDI, Edinburgh, Guanajuato, Namur, Oxford, 
Paris, Rome, Stockholm, Toulouse, the World Bank and Yale for useful comments. 
Chapter 3 would not have been possible without Roberto Pires who helped me 
obtain the data and patiently answered my questions about the Brazilian labour 
inspectorate. Thanks also to Mahamudu Bawumia for his encouragements and 
stimulating conversations, and to Stefan Dercon and the Center for the Study 
of African Economies (CSAE) at Oxford University for their hospitality during 
my academic visit. I thank Laurent Bach, Carlos Henrique Corseuil, Federico Fi­
nan, Maia Giiell, Roxana Gutierrez-Romero, Pedro Vicente and the participants
of the CSAE Research Workshop, 6th W B /IZ A  conference on Employment and 
Development in Mexico, Louis André Gérard Varet 2011 Conference on Public 
Economics, and the conference 011 Latin America at Goetingen. I thank Philippe 
Lemay-Boucher and Santiago Sânchez-Pâges for their comments on the fourth 
chapter and the participants at the Scottish Graduate Programme for Economics 
(SGPE) annual doctoral conference.
I was very fortunate to have been an Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) scholar, who funded my Postgraduate studies, my fieldwork in Paraguay 
and provided me with the opportunity to be an intern at the Prime Minister’s 
Strategy Unit. I am also thankful to the Scottish Institute for Research in Eco­
nomics (SIRE) and the University of Edinburgh for funding conference and sum­
mer school expenses and providing me with an excellent environment to research.
Last but not least, I am extremely grateful to Philippe Lemay-Boucher, Han­
nah and Ian Philp for their crucial support, advice and encouragements.
Declaration
I declare that this thesis was composed by myself and that the work contained 
therein is my own. The second chapter was co-authored, as acknowledged below. 
No other person’s work has been used without due acknowledgement. This thesis 
has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.
Thomas Flochcl
Declaration
I declare that this thesis was composed by myself and that the work contained 
therein is my own. The second chapter was co-authored, as acknowledged below. 
No other person’s work has been used without due acknowledgement. This thesis 
has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.
Thomas Flochel
Contents
1 Introduction and Overview 1
2 Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay, 
joint work with E. Auriol and S. Straub 5
2.1 In troduction ....................................................................................................  6
2.2 Literature R ev iew .......................................................................................... 7
2.3 Country Overview: Rent-Seeking and Corruption in Procurement 9
2.4 The M o d e l.......................................................................................................  12
2.4.1 R en t-S eek in g ..................................................................................  14
2.4.2 Implications of the M o d e l .......................................................... 17
2.5 The D a t a .......................................................................................................  18
2.6 Corruption and the Structure of P u rch ases...........................................  21
2.6.1 Methodology ..................................................................................  21
2.6.2 R esu lts................................................................................................ 22
2.7 The Profitability of F i r m s ......................................................................... 26
2.7.1 Methodology ..................................................................................  26
2.7.2 R esu lts...............................................................................................  28
2.7.3 Misallocation of T a le n t s .............................................................  29
2.8 C onclusion .......................................................................................................  32
Appendix A  34
A .l The M o d e l.......................................................................................................  34
A. 1.1 Proof of proposition 2.1   34
A .1.2 Proof of proposition 2.2 and of < 0 ............................... 34
A. 1.3 Proof of proposition 2.3 ............................................................. 35
A. 1.4 Proof of proposition 2.4 ............................................................. 35
A .2 Procurement Data .....................................................................................  37
A .2.1 Legal requirements for public procurement purchases . . .  37
A .2.2 Institution corruption d a ta ................................................ 39
A .3 Empirical Evidence. Complements ......................................................  40
A .3.1 Descriptive statistics on the relationship between institu­
tion budget size, corruption and contracts s i z e   40
A .3.2 Self-selection dummies (Section 2 .7 .3 ) ...........................  40
3 Political Manipulation in the
Enforcement of Labour Regulations 43
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 44
3.2 Labour regulation and en forcem en t......................................................  47
3.2.1 Institutional structure of the Labour Inspection Secretariat 47
3.2.2 Labour regulations and s a n c t io n s ..................................  49
3.3 Electoral politics in B r a z i l .......................................................................  50
3.4 Data and descriptive sta tistics ................................................................  52
3.5 Empirical m eth od ology ..............................................................................  54
3.6 R esu lts............................................................................................................. 58
3.6.1 Political manipulation of labour f in e s ...........................  58
3.6.2 An electoral strategy? ................................................................ 60
3.6.3 Robustness checks ....................................................................... 61
3.7 C onclusion ......................................................................................................  61
Appendix B 63
B .l Data description ........................................................................................  63
B.2 Empirical r e s u l t s ........................................................................................  68
4 Taxation and Informality in a
Dual Sector Probabilistic Voting M odel 72
4.1 In troduction ..................................................................................................  73
4.2 Model S e tu p ........................................................................................  76
4.2.1 Model assum ptions.............................................................  76
4.2.2 Choice of s e c to r ....................................................................  78
4.2.3 Policy preferences and v o t i n g ......................................... 80
4.3 Equilibrium policy and sector d is tr ib u t io n ........................................  83
4.4 C onclusion ...................................................................................................... 89
ii
Appendix C 91
C .l Derivation of (9)   91





2.1 Purchase mechanism used by types of g o o d ........................................  19
A .l Distribution of contracts and firms by types of g o o d s .................... 37
B .l Election t im in g ............................................................................................  63
B.2 Histogram of dependent variable.............................................................  66
B.3 Dependent variable mean-variance relationship.................................. 66
B.4 Dependent variable distribution on Poisson, Negative Binomial
and O b s e r v e d ................................................................................................  67
4.1 Sectoral distribution of a g e n ts ................................................................  79
4.2 Politicians’ vote share in each sector ................................................... 83
4.3 Equilibrium tax rate as a function o f relative returns to informality 85
4.4 Equilibrium tax rate, informality share and public good as relative
returns to informality in crease .................................................................. 86
4.5 Equilibrium tax rate as a function of productivity for a fixed insti­
tutional q u a l i t y .............................................................................................  88
List of Tables
2.1 Exceptional purchase d eterm in a n ts ......................................................  23
2.2 Exceptional purchase determinants and institution-level corruption 25
2.3 Procurement and profitability of firms ...............................................  28
2.4 Self-selection into procurement and firms’ profitability.................... 31
A .l Minimum daily wage, exchange rate and procurement thresholds . 38
A .2 Institution-level corre la tion s .................................................................... 40
A .3 Distribution of self-selection du m m ies................................................... 41
A .4 First stage estim ation s ..............................................................................  42
B .l Summary s ta tis t ic s .....................................................................................  64
B.2 T-test on mean difference between capitals and other towns . . . .  65
B.3 Labour fines and electoral cy c le s ............................................................. 68
B.4 Political motivations and labour fines: Margin of votes, partisan
alignment and term l i m i t s ........................................................................  69
B.5 Targeting o f towns along the electoral c y c le ........................................  70
B .6 Robustness checks........................................................................................  71
v
C H A P T E R  1
Introduction and Overview
It is widely recognised that institutions play a key role in a country’s economic de­
velopment.1 Countries with poor quality institutions generally suffer from perva­
sive corruption, a widespread culture of rent-seeking and large shadow economies, 
all of which hamper economic growth. Each chapter o f this thesis aims to shed 
light on a particular aspect of these issues.
Procurement is one o f the main areas of public spending at risk of corruption, 
especially in developing countries where regulations and their enforcement are of­
ten weak. Yet bad practice can be very costly. The second chapter o f this thesis 
shows how favouritism in the allocation of public procurement contracts distorts 
the industrial organisation of an economy, thereby reducing its growth potential. 
On top of the static costs of bribery and embezzlement, economic theory indi­
cates that systematic departures from competition and economic efficiency in the 
allocation of public markets are likely to have a devastating impact on economic 
agents’ incentives and as a result may induce important long-term distortions in a 
country’s productive structure. Murphy et al. (1991) ascribe these dynamic costs 
to distortions in the size of expected returns to unproductive rent-seeking rela­
tive to returns from innovative productive activities (such as entrepreneurship). 
When corruption tips the balance towards the former, they argue, potential en­
trepreneurs, particularly the more able ones, turn away from productive activities 
to capture the profits from rent-seeking. This results in reduced investments in 
innovation, lower aggregate output and an insidious purging of talent from the
1See North (1990); Olson (2000), or more recently Acemoglu et al (2002).
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productive sectors, which imposes important dynamic costs on the economy.
We illustrate this phenomenon in the case of Paraguay, where after more than 
60 years of single party rule, the resources of the state have been all but privatised 
along party lines. As a result, a widespread network of patronage through bribes 
and political favours has emerged, operating notably through the allocation of 
public contracts to firms that in most cases are created with the sole purpose of 
supplying the state, often by selling a variety of imported goods. There is ample 
anecdotal evidence of corruption in public procurement, examples of which are 
reviewed in the chapter’s introduction. We then build a model of entrepreneurial 
choice in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector, which provides 
predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in 
sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with 
corrupt contracts enjoy extra returns, so that procurement related activities at­
tract the best entrepreneurs. These predictions are tested using a large-scale 
microeconomic database including all public procurement operations over a 4- 
year period. We find that institutions with an important procurement activity 
are more likely to engage in corrupt dealings. As for firms, they have a greater 
probability of obtaining a contract directly through an exceptional procedure 
from an institution with which they have a strong contractual relation, particu­
larly when dealing with more corrupt State entities. Finally firms trading more 
with the public sector are found to be more profitable, even when controlling 
for their unobserved characteristics, reflecting the misallocation of talent towards 
this largely unproductive sector induced by favouritism. The consequences of 
such malpractice in Paraguay have been devastating. The industrial sector has 
been in steady decline since the 1970s and the economy more or less stagnant, 
with GDP per capita in 2005 equal to its late 1980s level.
The third chapter turns to labour market regulations and assesses whether po­
litical interests have affected their implementation since the late 1990s in Brazil. 
A growing body o f empirical research finds evidence that politicians in Brazil 
make use of their power to influence fiscal transfers and the implementation of 
regulations in order to promote their political interests. No such research into the 
work of the labour inspectorate has been conducted to date, despite an ongoing 
debate in Brazil about the level of autonomy which labour inspectors should enjoy 
and a long-lasting struggle by this bureaucracy to free itself from the pressures 
of politicians. Interference in regulatory enforcement implies varying degrees of 
implementation according to politicians’ local interests, which in the context of 
labour market regulations can have a significant impact on compliance as well as
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on firms’ productivity, employment and output. This is a matter that concerns 
Brazil in particular, with one of the most regulated labor markets in the world 
and over 40% of its workforce employed in the informal sector. The empirical 
analysis sets out firstly to evaluate the influence of (i) partisan alignment be­
tween different levels of government, (ii) electoral competition levels, and (iii) the 
presence of term limits, on the issuance of fines for labour infractions. Secondly, 
these political variables are interacted with dummies for election years to assess 
whether the pattern in sanctioning reflects a clientelist strategy aimed at swaying 
voters during election times. Each consideration is tested using a unique panel 
dataset including all fines distributed for infractions of labour regulations at a 
town level in two of Brazil’s largest and most industrialised states over a 12-year 
period. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that labour sanctions are 
at most marginally influenced by state governors’ interests, and that there is no 
evidence of their use to sway voters.
Chapter 4 turns to labour informality, a phenomenon that characterises most 
developing country labour markets. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
World Bank estimated in 2007 that 54 percent of total urban employment is in­
formal. In the same report, the authors show that these high informality rates 
go hand in hand with high poverty rates. Yet most cross-country studies report 
a significant negative correlation between taxation rates and the size of the infor­
mal sector. This result is paradoxical for two reasons. First, a higher tax burden 
on the formal sector is generally thought to drive economic activity underground, 
which leads most dual sector models with exogenous policy to predict that high 
taxation and barriers to entry are associated with large informal sectors. Second, 
under standard assumptions and a uniform distribution of ideological bias most 
voting models would predict that a greater share of the poor in the electorate 
should lead to more redistribution. This paradox is best explained through a 
political economy model. I build the first theoretical framework integrating a 
probabilistic voting model in a dual economy setting where agents endogenously 
choose their sector of activity. Endogenising both economic and political mech­
anisms enables the model to explain the negative correlation between taxation 
and informality rates found in cross-country data. This relationship is found to 
emerge from an optimal choice by social welfare-maximising politicians in coun­
tries that differ in institutional quality. I then perform comparative statics on the 
level of labour productivity and show that improvements in institutional quality 
are more important in countries with a less productive labour force, as they lead 
to greater increases in redistribution and reductions in the informality share.
3
Finally, chapter 5 concludes and presents some implications of this thesis.
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C H A P T E R  2
Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: 
The Case of Paraguay
Joint work with Emmanuelle Auriol and Stéphane Straub
Abstract
A  m o d el o f entrepreneurial choices in an econ om y w ith  a corrupt public  
procu rem ent sector is b u ilt, providin g pred ictions a lon g  tw o m ain  d im en ­
sions. F irst, corru ption  is m ore frequent in sectors w here p ublic  insti­
tu tion s are large buyers. S econ d , firm s favoured w ith  corru pt con tracts  
enjoy extra  returns, so th a t procu rem ent related  a ctivities a ttra ct th e b est  
entrepreneurs. A  large scale m icroecon om ic d a ta b a se , includin g all public  
procurem ent operations over a 4  year p eriod  in P aragu ay, a m o u n tin g  annu­
ally to  a p p rox im ately  6 %  o f the c o u n try ’s G D P , is th en  used to  corrob orate  
these predictions
K e y  words: P rocu rem en t, C o rru p tio n , R en t-seek in g , D ev elo p m en t;
JEL codes: H 5 7 , D 7 3 , D 7 2 , 0 5 .
2.1 Introduction
Public procurement of goods and services is one o f the main areas at risk of 
corruption in developing countries where regulations and legal enforcement are 
weak. On top of the static cost of corruption and fund embezzlement, system­
atic departures from competition in the attribution of public markets are likely 
to have a devastating impact on economic agents’ incentives and as a result 011 
these countries’ productive structure. This paper presents the first large scale 
micro-level evidence on the channels of rent-seeking and its impact 011 economic 
development, using a unique database of nearly 50,000 public procurement opera­
tions in Paraguay, covering the period 2004 to 2007. In a nutshell, we show that in 
Paraguay corrupt behaviour in the allocation o f public contracts is a key channel 
for rent-seeking. This large-scale network of favouritism, sometimes coined “la 
patria contratista” ,1 has deeply damaging economic consequences: public insti­
tutions buy goods and services at inflated prices, and the set of incentives facing 
potential entrepreneurs is biased towards unproductive activities.
To guide the analysis, we model the choice of potential entrepreneurs with 
idiosyncratic cost levels, between remaining in the informal sector or paying a 
fixed entry fee to become formal. A4oreover, in the formal sector they face the 
additional alternative o f joining a productive segment, where they serve private 
consumers competitively, or a rent-seeking one, where they sell to public insti­
tutions. In this rent sector, contracts are attributed by corrupt officials, who 
distort allocation rules in exchange for bribes. Firms willing to do business with 
the government must therefore be profitable enough to cover their production 
costs as well as the formality fee and the bribes. We derive from the model two 
main sets of predictions that are sustained by the data, revealing the following 
story.
First, we establish that in Paraguay the main channel for corruption in pro­
curement is the systematic use o f an “exceptional” purchase mechanism, which 
bypasses legally required minimum standards of transparency and competition. 
Exceptional purchases are made more frequently by institutions, which are big 
buyers of specific goods. Thus, when the public sector concentrates a large share 
of a domestic market, which happens mostly in import-oriented and service ac­
tivities, corruption rises. Moreover, the data reveal that this effect is reinforced 
by repeated interactions of these institutions with favoured firms: exceptional 
purchase is used more often by institution-firm pairs that trade in large volumes.
lrrhe “contracting homeland” , see for example Alfredo Boccia Paz, Diario Ultim a Hora, 
Asuncion, March 4th, 2009.
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Second, this implies that firms doing more business with the State, those 
in the so-called rent sectors, enjoy above normal rates of return and are the 
most efficient ones. We provide evidence of these two aspects, by showing that 
firms selling more to the public sector, as well as those selling more through the 
exception channel, have higher profit margins, despite the fact that they trade 
mostly in standard goods and should face competition for the market.
As a result, average relative profitability should be biased towards sectors with 
an important procurement component, distorting firms’ incentives and inducing 
additional entry in these activities. To the extent that this self-selection process 
pushes some o f the best potential entrepreneurs towards rent sectors, distracting 
them from innovative or export-oriented ventures, it generates a serious misal- 
location of talents issue across the economy. Indeed, we document this strong 
selection bias by exploiting an original econometric strategy using firms’ names.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the main 
strands o f related literature and spells out the contributions of the paper. Section 
3 describes the Paraguayan institutional environment. Section 4 develops the 
model and derives empirical predictions. Section 5 presents the data. Sections 6 
and 7 present the results related to the two main sets of theoretical predictions, 
and Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
The idea that rent-seeking behaviour has important social and economic costs is a 
relatively long-standing one in the economic and political science literature. Early 
contributions such as Tullock (1967; 1971), Buchanan (1980), Krueger (1974) and 
Baghwati (1982), were concerned, mostly in a theoretical framework, with the 
different types of costs associated with the transfer of rents and the waste gener­
ated by agents engaging time and resources in competing for rents, for example 
through political lobbying or corruption.
More recently, some papers have provided explanations for ways in which 
rent-seeking entails dynamic costs. Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1991) focus for example on the resulting dysfunctional allocation of tal­
ents. In this approach, potential investments in physical or human capital are 
directed to rent-abundant sectors (such as those stemming from political favours, 
corruption or exploitation o f natural resources), while investments in innovative 
activities, which have greater growth potential, become relatively less attractive 
and are discouraged. As supporting empirical evidence, Murphy et al. (1991)
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present cross-country growth regressions augmented with country level propor­
tions of engineering and law students, where the former are said to correspond to 
investments in productive activities while the latter are considered rent-seekers. 
Baumol’s evidence, on the other hand, is based on historical accounts from Rome, 
Ancient China and the Middle Ages.
To date, there is still very little micro-evidence on the actual channels and 
consequences of rent-seeking in developing economies. Some papers have stressed 
the difference in performance between “captor” and “non-captor” firms in tran­
sition countries (depending on their ability to influence regulations or attract 
specific concessions), using either subjective answers on influence in firm surveys 
(Heilman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2003; Fries et al. (2003), or regional measures of 
preferential treatment received by a sub-sample o f large firms (Slinko, Yakovlev 
and Zhuravskaya, 2004). Other contributions have documented the importance of 
political connections in securing access to key economic inputs. For example, Li, 
Meng, Wang and Zhou (2008) show that Chinese Communist Party members are 
more likely to obtain credit for their firms; Khwaja and Mian (2005) show how 
lending by public banks in Pakistan is systematically distorted towards firms 
with politicians on their boards; Hsieh, Miguel, Ortega and Rodriguez (2008) 
show that firms, whose directors have signed the recall petition against Chavez 
in Venezuela (the “Maisanta” ), have experienced significantly lower performance 
thereafter, in particular because of a rising tax burden and more difficult access 
to foreign exchange; Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) study how directors’ political 
connections help secure better regulatory conditions in the US; Fisman (2001) 
computes the stock market value of Indonesian firms derived from political con­
nections to the Suharto network, using exogenous shocks to the dictator’s health. 
At a more general level, the large literature on corruption that developed since 
the 1990s is also relevant here, and especially the strand of more recent papers 
using microeconomic evidence to directly measure corruption and its effects on 
outcomes.2
A few contributions have dealt specifically with public procurement. Hyyti- 
nen, Lundberg and Toinaven (2007), who study the effects of politics on municipal 
cleaning contracts in Sweden, show that the lowest bidder does not win 58% of 
the time and that the choice of the winner is subject to political considerations; 
Goldman, Rocholl and So (2009) show that US companies connected, through the
2Authoritative surveys on corruption include Bardhan (1997), Rose-Ackerm an (1999, 2006), 
Svensson (2005), Mishra (2005) and Pande (2008) among others. Micro-econometric papers in­
clude Reinikka and Svensson (2004), Olken (2007), Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna and Mullainathan  
(2007) and Ferraz and Finan (2007) to mention only a few.
composition of their boards, to the winning party in both legislative and presiden­
tial elections (in 1994 and 2000) are significantly more likely to have experienced 
an increase in procurement contracts. References dealing explicitly with corrup­
tion include Di Telia and Schargrodsky (2003), who document the impact of a 
crackdown on corruption in Argentinean hospitals, and Bandiera, Prat and Val­
letta (2009), who disentangle the effect of passive (inefficiency) versus active waste 
(corruption) in Italy, finding that the former accounts for about four times the 
effect of the latter.
W ith respect to this literature, our paper provides several original contribu­
tions. First, we have data not only on the expenses realised by public institutions, 
but also on the firms that are on the selling side. This enables us to capture the 
effect of large scale corrupt practices on the profitability of firms and hence on the 
industrial structure of the economy.3 We provide evidence o f the distortive effects 
of rent-seeking in terms of economic efficiency, by showing that it implies an inef­
ficient specialisation of the more able entrepreneurs in imports and procurement 
activities. Second, we document one of the most prevalent channels of corruption 
in procurement activity, namely the use of purchase mechanisms circumventing 
standard rules, and uncover the economic characteristics of the institutions and 
sectors more prone to it.
2.3 Country Overview: Rent-Seeking and Cor­
ruption in Procurement
Paraguay is a small landlocked country of 6.2 million inhabitants (2008) located 
in the heart of South America. W ith a per capita GDP of US$ 1,670 in 2008, it is 
a low-middle income country. Its main sources o f growth are agrarian activities 
and local services.4 The country also enjoys a unique source o f rent in the form 
of revenues from big hydroelectric dams shared with its neighbours Argentina 
and Brazil. The biggest one is Itaipú, on the river Paraná between Paraguay and 
Brazil. Until the Chinese Three Gorges dam was built, Itaipú was the largest 
hydroelectric power plant in the world. It has 20 turbines, 1 of which provides 90%
3Related papers are Rama (1993), who tracks the number of foreign-trade rent-seeking regu­
lations over the X X th  century in Uruguay and relates these to political and economic variables, 
and Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004), who present cross-country, industry level evidence of 
the effect of regulatory distortions on the industrial structure.
4Indeed, a few non-processed commodities constitute its very narrow export base: 50%  of 
all exports are in 3 traditional products (soy, cotton and m eat); adding other barely processed 
commodities makes up close to 90%  of total exports.
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of all the energy used in Paraguay. The rest is channeled to Brazil.0 In exchange, 
Paraguay receives every year an enormous amount of royalties, amounting to US$ 
366 millions in 2005 (resp. US$ 553 millions in 2006), equivalent to 4.9% (resp. 
5.8%) of GDP. This is approximately 50% of the total government tax collection 
(from VAT, custom duties, and rent, by order o f magnitude).
Politically, after enduring the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner between 1954 
and 1989, Paraguay returned to democracy through a military coup in 1989. Yet, 
the Asociación Nacional Republicana, traditionally known as Colorado Party, 
managed to retain power for 61 years, including the 19 years elapsed since the 
1989 coup and covering the whole period o f our study.6 Given this political con­
text, the dams’ propitious source o f income shaped the growth of the Paraguayan 
“rent-seeking economy” . First, the dams’ construction fostered a culture of in­
tense rent-seeking and corruption and allowed a few entrepreneurs that were on 
good terms with the dictator to become immensely rich. Second, the free flow of 
resources to the government’s budget meant that bureaucrats were in a position 
to favour friends through public expenses. During the whole period, the party 
effectively “privatised” public resources, using public employment and procure­
ment to favour party members.7 As a result, Paraguay is considered to be one of 
the most corrupt countries in the world.8
An important channel for corruption, which we focus on here, is the allocation 
of public contracts to firms that in most cases are created with the sole purpose 
of supplying the state, often by selling a wide variety of imported goods. There 
is ample anecdotal evidence of corruption in public procurement. As a result, 
and under pressure from international organisations, a law regulating public pro­
curement practices (law 2051/03) was enacted in 2003 by the government of the 
newly elected president Nicanor Duarte Frutos, with the announced intention of 
promoting transparency and efficiency in public purchases. The most significant 
of its provisions were the creation of a public procurement watchdog (the National 
Directorate of Public Procurement, or DNCP), the design of a menu of purchase 
mechanisms to regulate procurement procedures, and the compulsion to make all 
information (calls, providers, award etc.) public. This last proviso was accompa­
5 Additionally, there is another huge dam, the Yacyreta, one, lower down on the same river, 
on the border between Paraguay and Argentina. It is about one fourth the size of Itaipú.
6See Pérez-Liñán et al. (2006) for a description of the political environment of Paraguay. In 
April 2008, the Colorado party was finally defeated in the presidential election by an opposition  
coalition led by former Catholic bishop Fernando Lugo.
'See for example Nickson and Lambert (2002).
8It has lingered in the bottom  4%  of surveyed countries included in Transparency Interna- 
tional’s Corruption Perception Index since its inclusion in 2002. It had for instance a score of 
2.1 in 2005, placing it 144th out of 158, and the same score in 2009 (154th out of 180).
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nied by the creation of the DNCP web site where this information is available, 
but in practice access is often intermittent and the interface is impractical.
There are strong indications however that improvements in the regulatory 
framework did not translate quickly into cleaner procurement practices, partly 
because many officials did not comply with the new law and the wrongdoings con­
tinued.9 As shown in Figure 2.1 below, in the period under study over 70% of all 
procurement contracts are awarded without competition. The main mechanism 
through which firms are favoured is the use of the exceptional purchase mech­
anism, by which specific regulations, such as the obligation to organise public 
tenders above certain amounts, are disregarded (see details in Section 5 below).
In 2006, Transparencia Paraguay (T P ), the local chapter o f Transparency 
International, published an extensive report focusing on the excessive use of ex­
ceptional procedures, which was clearly identified as one of the main irregularities 
in the procurement process. Indeed, in 2004 and 2005 purchases made through 
the “exceptional” procedure amounted to nearly 23% of the total procurement 
spending. For example during that period public firms awarded close to 90% of 
their advertisement contracts through exceptions. As for specific institution, the 
Office of the First Lady spent respectively 40% and 93% of its budget in these 
two years using the exceptional mechanism.10
Because the report was given ample coverage in the local media and through 
public presentations, some of the officials in charge of procurement in public 
institutions may have become more cautious. Indeed, purchases made through 
the “exceptional” procedure decreased over the period that we study. Still, they 
did not disappear, representing 17.3% of the total procurement spending between 
2004 and 2007.
In 2006 the Superior Tribunal of Electoral Justice channeled 23% of its total 
spending through exceptions, while for the public enterprise “Cañas Paraguayas” 11 
the corresponding figure was 59%. In 2007, an electoral year, the Presidency spent 
16% of its budget through exceptional contracts. In all these cases, it is difficult
9The World Bank’s review of Paraguay’s public expenditure in 2006 states that: “Opera­
tional efficiency is reduced by the existence of informal arrangements alongside formal rules. 
W hile spending control is highly centralised, with detailed rules concerning (...)  procurement 
and other items of expenditure, these formal controls are often violated in practice [and] informal 
arrangements dictate how (...) procurement is contracted. W hen formal rules are unworkable 
and government operates through extralegal means, corruption rises although it often goes 
undetected or unreported.”
10Some cases have made headlines, such as the use of this procedure to pay close to US$ 
100,000 to a consulting firm formerly owned by the President, for the organisation of the X I11"' 
conference gathering Am ericas’ First Ladies in 2005 in Asunción (Diario U ltim a Hora, Asunción. 
June 7th, 2007).
11 The State-owned alcohol-producing firm.
11
to argue that the use of the exception responded either to situations o f emergency 
or to non-competitive markets. The State-owned electricity enterprise ANDE has 
also been pointed out for buying large numbers o f electric transformers in this 
way, despite the fact that these are routinely required by the firm for network 
repairs. Firm officials recognise that this practice usually generates excess pricing 
of between 17 and 27%.12 During the yellow fever outbreak of 2008, a state of 
national emergency was declared and, as a result, the Health Ministry proceeded 
to buy large quantity o f fuel through exceptional purchases. The main provider, 
benefited with half of the total purchase, did not even have a distribution network 
in the interior of the country where the immunisation campaign was taking place, 
and close to three quarters of this fuel was actually delivered after the emergency 
period.13 In a recent scandal, the education ministry invoked exception grounds 
to spend US$3 million on a building in the center of Asunción, although such 
move had been planned for a about a year. Another year later, it was announced 
that the building was falling apart and that US$700,000 would be needed to fix 
it.14
The next Section builds a model from which we derive testable predictions.
2.4 The Model
The model focuses on constant returns to scale industries (i.e., linear cost func­
tion).15 We model a representative industry, of which there are many that vary 
in their characteristics such as the size o f the private and public sector demands, 
entry costs, relative marginal cost of formal versus informal sector production. In 
each industry entrepreneurs have the choice between the informal and the formal 
sectors. In the informal sector, denoted by the superscript / ,  there is no entry 
fee or taxation. Traditional production techniques prevail so that the cost of 
production is C \ q ) =  cq , where q >  0 is the quantity produced by the firm. The 
sector being competitive, in equilibrium the price is p1 =  c >  0.
By contrast, in the formal sector, denoted by the superscript / ,  firms need to 
pay an entry fee F  >  0.16 The total cost function of a producer operating in the
12Diario A B C  Color, Asunción, January 3rd, 2010. These figures are consistent with the 
estimation by Auriol (2006) and with the results in Section 7 below.
13Diario Ultim a Hora, Asunción, July 25th, 2008.
14Diario A B C  Color, Asunción, January 6th, 2010, and Diario Ultim a Hora, Asunción, De­
cember 22nd, 2010.
15This assumption is consistent with existing evidence on manufacturing and service firms 
in developing countries, whether they belong to the formal or the informal sector (see Tybou t, 
2000). It is also consistent with the nature of activities included in our procurement database.
16In the model taxation goes entirely through the entry fees. Yet we could add a linear tax
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formal sector is C f (q) =  F  +  cf q, where by assumption 
A 1  cf is independently and uniformly distributed in [0, c].
Formality gives access to a large set of technologies and management tech­
niques so that entrepreneurs “abilities” (i.e., education, physical capital, experi­
ence, attitude towards innovation, access to credit markets and so on) matter. 
Production costs are hence lower and have a priori a wider dispersion in the 
formal sector than in the informal one.
As a benchmark, we first briefly discuss the corruption-free equilibrium. In 
the absence of rent-seeking opportunities, entrepreneurs specialise in productive 
activities. They serve market demand competitively and make no rents in equi­
librium. The demand is composed of the private demand D(jp) — A  — p, where 
A >  c is a scale parameter that indicates the depth of the market,17 and the 
public demand D Pub(p) =  where Q c >  0 is the fixed public budget allocated 
to procurement. For the private demand consumers purchase from the cheapest 
provider. Proposition 2.1 summarises the industrial organisation of this economy 
(see derivation in the Appendix).
P ro p o s it io n  2.1 In a corruption-free economy, formality prevails in a given in­
dustry if and only if
A Q ^  c -F — . (2-1)
c
P ro o f. See appendix A .1.1. ■
Proposition 2.1 implies that if F  is small the traditional technique of pro­
duction disappears. Production occurs in the formal sector in equilibrium at the 
lowest prevailing marginal cost cf*. On the other hand, in countries where barri­
ers to entry are high there is a segmentation between formal and informal sectors 
based on types of business or industry. An industry is organised formally if de­
mand is strong (i.e., A  and Q  large), and if the difference in productivity between 
traditional and modern methods o f production, c1 — cf * =  c, is large enough.18 
If (2.1) does not hold, public procurement cannot occur because by regulation
t on operational profit without changing the equilibrium (see Auriol and W arlters, 2005). In 
practice entry fees are higher, in percentage of per capita G D P, in poor countries than in rich 
ones (Djankov et ah, 2002).
17Assum ption A >  c rules out corner solutions in the rest of the paper. N ote that results are 
robust to other demand specifications (e.g., C obb-D ouglas).
18W e expect c1 -  cf * to be small for services such as car washing or fruit selling (which do not 
suffer large productivity losses due to poor infrastructure or the inability to enforce contracts 
in courts and do not benefit too much from innovations). A s a result, these activities are
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public officials are required to purchase from the formal sector. To rule out this 
possibility in the sequel of the paper we make the following assumption:
A 2  F  <  cQ.
Since A >  c, under assumption A2 condition (2.1) always holds so that in the 
absence of corruption formality prevails. Any distortion away from this efficient 
equilibrium can then be related to corruption.
2.4.1 Rent-Seeking
We assume that individuals managing public institutions’ purchases aim at max­
imising the total amount of bribes they extract from their suppliers. While this 
assumption cannot be directly tested, because in practice corruption and bribes 
are not observed, the model based on this null hypothesis will generate a number 
of testable predictions discussed below.
The first prediction, which is from Auriol (2006), is that, independently of 
the type of commodity, a corrupt procurement official favours limited tendering 
procedures, thereby maximising the price of the purchase and his bribe. We 
thus expect corrupt Paraguayan public institutions to rely on the excep­
tional purchase mechanisms. A firm, which is invited to serve the market in 
a monopoly position, asks for the highest possible price, c. In the rent sector, 
denoted by the superscript r, a contract of size q hence costs T r(q ) =  cq ,19
The decision parameter of government officials is b G [0,1], the share o f T r(q ) 
they take in exchange for giving the market to a firm without competition. In 
doing so, government officials do not try to distinguish between different en­
trepreneurs: they simply split the total quantity in equal parts among them, 
asking for a fixed share of each of these contracts in bribes.
Let cr (b) G [0,c] denote the firm that is just indifferent between the rent and 
the productive sector. We show in the appendix that
l22>
We deduce that IT'(c) =  Q c cT̂ b)c >  0 if and only if c <  cr(b) <  c. En­
trepreneurs who choose to do business with the government are the 
most efficient ones and they make rents. By contrast entrepreneurs with
informal in developing countries. On the contrary, sophisticated com m odities such as medicine 
or cars, which require a warranty or a certification, are characterised by larger values o f c1 - c f *, 
justifying that firms choose formality.
19For more details see Auriol (2006).
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costs higher than cr(6) would make a loss, and so prefer not to enter the pio
c r ( 6)
curement sector. It is intuitive that the share of firms in the lent sectoi, - 
(1 _  b ) ^ p  <  1, decreases with b and F  and increases with cQ. The more greedy 
government representatives are, the more profitable firms need to be to do busi­
ness with them: they need to be able to cover the fixed cost of entry plus the 
bribes and still make non-negative profit.
To compute the optimal bribe rate, public officials internalize the risk o f cor­
ruption being detected and punished.20 Consistently with empirical evidence in 
Paraguay for the time of our study, we focus on weak punishment: in case of 
detection the bribe is simply lost to the officials. We assume that the probability 
of detection for any procurement contract is G (—y ^ )  where c is the frac­
tion of firms excluded from the rent sector and G (x ) is a strictly increasing and 
convex function varying between 0 and 1 for £ £ [0,1]. The expected bribe value 
writes B =  bcQ ( l  -  G (c~ ° ^ )^ . We deduce the next result.
Proposition 2.2 Let (p =  € [0,1) by assumption A2. Let HG(x ) =  be
the hazard rate function associated to G(x) .  The optimal bribe rate, br, is solution
(see proof in the Appendix). Proposition 2.2 hence implies that the optimal bribe 
rate decreases with F. This is because corruption competes with taxation: firms 
that have to pay bribes are less able to pay taxes. More importantly for the 
empirical analysis, the optimal bribe rate also increases with the amount spent 
in public procurement Qc. Institutions with large budgets are able to distribute 
larger lots to more firms, hence they can ask for a larger share o f contracts 
in bribes without increasing the risk o f detection. We hence expect, at the 
purchasing institution level, a positive correlation between the volume 
of procurement activity and the use of exceptional purchase.
In practice corruption detection varies from one institution to another. These 
differ in their level of exposure to public scrutiny, depending for example on how
20This is a common assumption in the corruption literature, going back to the Becker and 
Stigler (1974) crime-deterrence model. See for example Besley and MacLaren (1993) and 
Mookherjee and Png (1995). Di Telia and Schardgrosky (2004) is an empirical application.
to:
(2.3)
Proof. See appendix A. 1.2. ■
Under a technical assumption, one can check that dbd <  0 for all <fr £ [0,1]
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many people are harmed by corruption or on how politically sensitive their ac­
tivities are. They also differ in their capacity to realise and hide corrupt acts. 
In the context of the model, this simply translates into hazard rate dominance, 
which implies stochastic dominance.21 The next result is derived in the Appendix.
Proposition 2.3 Let G{.) and K ( . )  be two distributions o f corruption detection.
Mi  V l e  I0’ iJ =*• (24)
Proof. See appendix A. 1.3. ■
Everything else equal, institutions characterised by a lower probability o f de­
tection (i.e., lower hazard rate) will have a higher bribe rate and, by virtue of 
equation (2.2), smaller number of firms, and thus larger lots size. We deduce that, 
everything else equal, institutions characterised by a lower probability of 
detection will rely more heavily on exceptional purchase and will have 
larger lots size attributed to their providers. We are now ready to derive 
the global market equilibrium.
Proposition 2.4 Let br((f>) be defined by equation (2.3) and cr(</>) =  
Entrepreneurs choose the rent sector if and only if
c < c r( £ ) .  (2.5)
In the productive sector, formality prevails if and only if
■4 £  e +  ,  5 , f ' . (2.6)
Proof. See appendix A. 1.4.
Proposition 2.4 (see derivation in Appendix) indicates that the most produc­
tive entrepreneurs (i.e., those with c <  cr( ^ ) )  choose the rent sector where there 
is no competition and commodities are overpriced, while the less productive firms 
are left to serve private demand. Compared to a corruption-free economy, prices 
are higher both in the public and private segments o f the economy so that the
21 Let K {.)  and G (.) be two probability functions so that Y - g (x) -  \ - k \x) ^x  6  i°- !]> tllen 
it implies that G(x)  <  K {x )  Vx €  [0,1] (e.g., see N anda and Shaked, 2 0 0 1 )*
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quantities consumed and produced in equilibrium are everywhere smaller, leading 
to lower aggregate production. Comparing condition (2.6) with condition (2.1), it 
is straightforward to check that the formal productive sector shrinks. This effect 
is stronger in sectors where public purchases are large. Indeed, since <  0,
proposition 2.4 implies that dcj£ -  <  0 for all <fi € [0,1] so that >  0. More­
over we can show that ^  >  0 (see Appendix). Everything else being equal, 
the percentage of entrepreneurs who enter the rent sector and the size 
of their lots both increase with cQ .
2.4.2 Implications of the Model
The model generates 2 main sets of testable predictions.
1. Corruption and the structure o f purchases. In practice procurement activ­
ities are decentralised at the institution level (ministries, state enterprises, etc.), 
so the predictions of the model apply at the purchase center-level. The theory 
predicts that corrupt institutions rely on the exceptional mechanism to circum­
vent competition and maximise bribes. We do not observe bribes, but we do 
observe purchase mechanisms. Therefore, we use the occurrence o f exceptional 
purchases as dependent variable, to proxy for the fact that a given contract in­
volves corruption.
First, proposition 2.2 shows that corrupt demands increase in markets where 
institutions are big buyers o f the good. Therefore, controlling for all other stan­
dard determinants of exceptions, the likelihood that an individual contract is 
made by exceptional purchase should be higher when an institution’s budget, as 
a percentage o f the total sector’s production, increases.
Second, controlling for institutions’ budget size (which will be taken care of 
by institutions-year fixed effects), we can exploit the heterogeneity in the proba­
bility of corruption detection at the institution level stressed in proposition 2.3. 
For institutions that are more efficient at hiding corruption, we expect a stronger 
correlation between the frequency of exceptional purchases and the market shares 
attributed to providers.
2. Profitability of firms. Entrepreneurs in the rent sector make profits that
exceed the levels observed in normal competitive sectors. These rents are derived
from sales at inflated prices, because competition for the market is suppressed
by corruption. However, only entrepreneurs that are efficient enough can af­
ford to cover the cost of the related bribes. A corollary is therefore that these
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entrepreneurs are also the most able ones, those with the highest intrinsic or 
acquired abilities (see (2.5) in proposition 2.4).
Finally, the model has noteworthy industrial organisation implications. Al­
though we do not intend to test these directly in this paper, we briefly address 
them in the conclusion. In sectors producing goods procured intensively, the for­
mal productive sector shrinks (see (2.6) in proposition 2.4). In addition, sectors 
in which a large fraction of output is sold to the government are characterised by 
less competition. Where there is corruption, prices are bid up in all sectors and 
quantities are depressed, leading to lower aggregate production.
2.5 The Data
Procurement data
The main data set tracks all the procurement transactions made over the 
period 2004 to 2007 between 73 public entities (representing over 90% of total 
Paraguayan public spending and employment) and 5,517 different private sup­
pliers.22 These 47,615 public purchases include all types o f goods and services, 
from stationary to machinery, oil purchases, food, services, etc. There are good 
reasons to believe that no public procurement operations escape registration as, 
under the new system, contracts need to be registered and executed before the 
corresponding funds are released. Total public spending amounts to Gs. 12,400 
bn. (approx. US$ 2,235m), which represents 5.5% of Paraguay’s GDP in 2004, 
5.6% in 2005, 6.3% in 2006 and 6.9% in 2007.
Each observation in the procurement data set contains the name and type of 
the public entity, the name and legal registration number (RUC) of the supplying 
firm and its owner, and information on the purchase including the nature o f the 
good or service categorised in 16 different groups, the total cost in local currency, 
and the purchase mechanism used.
Purchase mechanisms are a key provision o f the 2003 public procurement law, 
regulating the procedures to be followed in allocating contracts depending on 
their total value expressed in multiples of the current legal minimum daily wage 
(mdw).23 There are five legal purchase mechanisms with gradually increasing 
constraints on the minimum number o f offers, the mode and length of publication 
of the call for offers, and the attribution procedure. Below a value o f 2,000 mdw,
" T h e  data we use was initially painstakingly compiled by Transparencia Paraguay (T P ), the 
national chapter of the international N G O  Transparency International, using the information  
published on the D N C P  web site.
23See the Appendix for more details.
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a direct purchase is allowed, with public institutions legally compelled to have 
offers from at least three different firms. Between 2,000 mdw and 10,000 mdw, 
a so-called competitive bidding process is required, the call for offers must be 
published in advance and the minimum number o f suitable offers is five. Finally, 
for contracts o f a value above 10,000 mdw, a national or an international public 
tender must be organised, with still more stringent rules.
Finally, these guidelines can be disregarded in cases of emergency, such as 
natural disasters or health epidemics (for example the dengue fever outbreak of 
2007), for the purchase of patented and copyrighted goods, or for purchases re­
quiring defence secrecy. In those extraordinary circumstances, public officials can 
skip all formal purchase requirements through the so-called exceptional purchase 
mechanism. Figure 2.1 shows that exceptional purchases are quite common for 
certain categories of goods or services, such as rentals, advertisement, consultancy 
and transport.
The distribution of contract values has a fat left-hand tail (84% of purchases 
cost less than 2000 mdw.), while 5.5% of contracts costing over 10,000 mdw make 
up 86% of the total spending. The sample mean is approximately US$ 47,000, 
equivalent to 36 times the national per capita GDP at the time.24
24There are a bit more than 200 contracts with a value superior to US$ 1 million and the 
largest contract is worth U S$ 184 million. The 10 largest procurement contracts are oil purchase 
by the state monopoly Petropar.
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Firms ’ profits
We use annual rankings of top taxpayers published on the Ministry of Fi­
nance’s web site. Firms’ ranks are determined by their total payments on all 
taxes.25 Once public firms are excluded, we have information for 748 firms in 
2004, 459 firms in 2005, 482 firms in 2006, and 478 firms in 2007.
We use the information on total tax disbursements to approximate firms’ 
profits, exploiting the fact that the income gains tax had a flat rate o f 30% in 
2004, 20% in 2005 and 10% thereafter. Issues related to the inclusion o f other 
taxes and to evasion are discussed in the empirical section below.
Import-export data
We also include annual rankings from the Customs’ SOFIA  official data base. 
These include the full universe o f importers from 2004 to 2007, including the 
total free on board (FOB) value imported, and of exporters for the same period, 
including the cost, insurance, freight (CIF) value exported.
Production data
We are able to match the good categories from our procurement database with 
National Account data for 6 categories of goods (food, rentals, fuel products, 
construction, machinery and transport). This is sectoral gross GDP data at 
the 2-digit ISIC level, as published by the Paraguayan Central Bank’s Office of 
Economic Studies. Fuel is an outlier, as large amounts are bought from foreign 
companies (total procurement represents up to 15 times national production in 
some years). Once it is excluded, we match 17,438 observations, equivalent to 
36.6% of the initial sample. We use this data to create a variable measuring total 
national production of the respective sectors year by year.
Institution-level corruption indices
We introduce institution-level corruption indices for a subset of 13 institutions 
in our sample.26 In total, this covers 15,640 of our initial observations, equivalent 
to 32.8% of the total. These indices were developed by the NGO Transparencia 
Paraguay between 2004 and 2008 (see Appendix for details).
25Systematic data on total sales, profits, etc., for the whole universe of firms could not be 
accessed due to confidentiality restrictions.
26The institutions are Custom s, the Senate, the Ministry of Education, the Supreme Court, 
the Social Prevision Institute, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Housing Council, the 
Ministry of Justice, the M inistry of Health, the Superior Tribunal for Electoral Justice, the N a­
tional Institute for Rural Land Development, the Public Ministry (Public Prosecutors’ Office), 
and the Police (which belongs to the Ministry of Interior).
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2.6 Corruption and the Structure of Purchases
2.6.1 Methodology
First, we want to test one of the m odel’s main predictions, namely the fact that 
the use of exceptional purchases increases in the share of institutions’ purchases 
in national sectoral production.
Our unit of observation is the individual purchase. Each o f the 47,615 pur­
chases available corresponds to a pair composed of a firm i and an institution j .  
The data set includes 73 institutions and 5517 firms, and in total there are 13,693 
different “active” pairs, with an average number o f contracts equal to 3.5 (std. 
dev. 10.5), a minimum of 1 (for 7,215 pairs) and a maximum of 460.
We estimate the following model:
excijkt =  1 [exc* — 9i +  9j +  9k +  9t +  9jt +  PiQjkt +  X ijkt/32 +  eijkt >  0], (2.7)
where 1 [.] is an indicator function equal to 1 if the statement in brackets is true, 
exc  is a binary variable equal to 1 if the contract is made through the exception, 
9's are firm (i), institution ( j) ,  good (k ), year (f), and institution-year (j t ) fixed 
effects, Xijkt is a vector of controls, and Q jkt is the share of the total national 
production of good k procured by institution j  in year t. W e expect /3\ to be 
positive.
The vector of controls includes firm-institution level variables: the total value 
of each pair’s transactions, and the proportion of an institution’s transactions 
done with each particular provider. These variables are meant to control for 
additional political or personal connections, and other effects such as reputation, 
which may influence contract allocation. We report these results, as they turn 
out to be relevant when we later introduce institution-level corruption. Other 
controls include the size o f contracts, as we expect larger contracts that carry the 
obligation o f an open bidding procedure to induce a different behaviour, and the 
yearly level of production of the sector, to ensure that our results are not polluted 
by sector size effects, for example if smaller sectors are more dependent on public 
procurement and therefore more subject to abuses. These results are omitted to 
save space.
The inclusion of fixed effects allows us to capture any systematic determi­
nants of exceptional purchase that would correspond to characteristics o f the 
firms (competitive advantage, exclusive dealing on a specific good), the goods 
(patented or monopolistic goods) and the institutions (specifically dedicated to
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attend emergencies, involved in defence deals, etc., possibly with changes ovei 
time), as well as specific time fluctuations or trend in the use o f exceptions. 
Once these fixed effects are introduced, we expect no additional features to be 
significant if procurement rules are applied correctly.
We use a linear probability model to estimate the model above. The inclusion 
of fixed effects prevents us from using a Probit estimation, while a conditional 
Logit would imply eliminating any pair for which there is no within variation, 
therefore reducing the final sample by approximately half.
2.6.2 Results
Table 2.1 contains the first set of results. It shows that more corruption (excep­
tional purchase) occurs when a public institution is a big buyer on the market, in 
the sense o f purchasing a large share of a sector’s production. In columns (1) to 
(4), the variable Qjfci (P rocurem ent/N at.P rod^) is systematically positive and 
significant. One additional percentage point in the share o f the sector’s produc­
tion implies a 0.2 to 0.3% increase in the probability o f using the exception. It 
is hard to think of an explanation other than corruption to explain the positive 
sign of the variable Qjkt-
This result is key to understanding the distortions induced by corrupt pro­
curement. Indeed, it tells us that in each sector the prevalence o f wrongdoings 
is positively related to the weight o f the public sector as a client. The economic 
effect is far from trivial. Domestic producers in sectors in which public purchases 
represent around 25% of total sales, such as drugs or machinery, face a 5 to 8% 
additional probability o f being favoured with exceptional purchases compared 
with other sectors where public intervention is marginal (around 1% for trans­
port or food for example). Given the extra-profitability that we uncover in the 
next section, this clearly increases the attractiveness of these activities.
Moreover, this is reinforced by the nature o f specific institution-firm interac­
tions. In columns (2) to (4), we also show that flrm-institution pairs that do 
more business together use the exceptional purchase mechanism more often. The 
coefficient for the total value of a pair’s transactions (firm J n stit-v a l) in col­
umn (2) implies that an additional US$ 200,000 translate in an increase o f 0 .4% 
in the probability to use the exception. The coefficient for the share of institu­
tions’ transactions done with each particular provider (institjirm.vaLshare) in 
column (3) implies that an institution that increases the share of its total pro­
curement volume allocated to a particular firm by one standard deviation above 
the sample mean (that is 3.8% of its portfolio rather than 0.9%), would increase
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the share of its contracts with that particular firm made through the exception 
by more than 13%. A pair with a volume o f contracts two standard deviations 
above the sample mean (that is 6.7% of the institution’s portfolio rather than 
0.9%), would use the exception for 22% of its contracts.
Table 2.1: Exceptional purchase determinants
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exc. Purchase Matched goods sample only Full sample 2004-2005 only
Procurement/Nat.Prodjjtt 0.178** 0.167** 0.175** 0.0313***
(0.0834) (0.0817) (0.0819) (0.0108)
Firm_instit-val 0.0430*** 0.0324** 0.000499 0.0296***
(0.0139) (0.0126) (0.0016) (0.00719)
InstitJinn_val_share 0.135*** 0.101** 0.0211 0.0112
(0.0508) (0.045) (0.0136) (0.00817)
Firms F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instit. F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Goods F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instit*years F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17438 17438 17438 17438 47615 22180
R-squared 0.597 0.597 0.597 0.598 0.532 0.524
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the institution level. * p  <  0.1, ** p  <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01 
Note: Procurem ent/N at.Prodjkt =  institution f  s purchase o f good  k  as a fraction o f  sector fc’s production;
firm J n stit-v a l =  total value o f pair i j  contracts; in s tit -f irm ju a lsh a re  =  value o f institution j  contracts with firm 
i as a share o f total value o f institution j  contracts.
In columns (5) and (6), we run some robustness checks on the pair vari­
ables, using alternative samples.27 First, we use the whole sample, and then
restrict ourselves to the period 2004-2005, in which the prevalence o f excep­
tional purchases was higher. In both cases, the signs are as expected and the
in s t it .f  irmvuaLshare variable is nearly significant at the 10% level, while 
firrri-instit-val is strongly significant in the 2004-2005 sample.
Alternative interpretations are possible for the results that frequent pair in­
teractions lead to more contracts through the exception. For example, one could 
argue that a “reputation” effect is at play. In circumstances where public insti­
tutions need to use exceptional mechanisms, for example because o f some social 
emergency, they naturally turn to firms they have had frequent interactions with, 
because they know these are more reliable. Yet another explanation would in­
volve simple inefficiency or passive waste, as Bandiera et al. (2009) document 
in the case o f public procurement in Italy. Here, the argument would be that 
procurement officials simply award contracts to firms they already know, because 
they do not internalize the new rules (they may be badly informed about the
2'A s  we include all good categories, this forces us to exclude the production share variable.
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regulations and fail to respect deadlines or to advertise the calls for applications) 
or because they are lazy and it is the solution that requires less effort. W hile 
the “reputation” explanation is clearly the most efficient, the welfare implica­
tions of the inefficiency relative to the corruption stories depend on a few factors. 
Bandiera et al. (2009) point out that in the case of corruption, the procurement 
agent derives utility from transactions, where as passive waste entails utility for 
no one. However, by generating rents in the public procurement sector, corrup­
tion attracts the most talented entrepreneurs to industries where corrupt public 
sector institutions are most active. This misallocation of talent, which is the 
topic of the next section, can entail very high welfare costs as it raises the price 
of goods and services purchased by both private and public demand.
To evaluate both the “reputation” and the “efficiency” arguments and com ­
pare them to the “corruption” story, we can use the result of proposition 2.4. It 
suggests that institutions more exposed to public scrutiny use less exceptional 
purchase. We use the institution-level corruption indices described in the data 
section to proxy for this exposure. We measure corruption with a synthetic index 
equal to the arithmetic mean of the three original indices, namely the evaluations 
based on the Comptroller General’s report and on the number o f administra­
tive indictments in any given institution, and the number o f newspaper articles 
mentioning corruption in the institution.28
We introduce the following specification:
exc^kt — 1 [exc* =  6i +  9j +  6  ̂+  Of +  f3\Qjkt +  P2In s t C orr^
+Xijf33 +  (Xij  * In st C orrjt) f34 +  jktPs +  £ijkt >  0]. (2.8)
If the corruption story is relevant, we expect /32, and especially /34 to be 
positive.
The results in Table 2.2 support the corruption hypothesis. In columns (1) to 
(3), we restrict our sample to the observations matched to the National Accounts. 
Note that the variable measuring the share of procurement demand in national 
production is again positive and strongly significant.
In column (1), corruption introduced alone is positive (more corruption cor­
responds to a higher value of the index) and nearly significant.29 In column (2),
28The news index might be subject to caution, as press coverage of specific institutions, based 
for example on journalists inquiries or on denunciations, is likely to be influenced by the nature 
of the institutions and their past behaviour in procurement or other activities. Using only 
the mean of the evaluations based 011 the Comptroller General’s report and on the number of 
administrative indictments in any given institution yields similar results.
- 9Note that when corruption is introduced alone, it rules out the use o f institution-year fixed
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pairs’ contract value becomes negative, while its interaction with corruption is 
positive and significant. This confirms that the link between frequent interactions 
and exceptional purchases is mediated by corruption. Compared with Table 2.1, 
the effect is 4 times larger for an institution that is at the top o f the corrupt scale 
(an additional US$ 200,000 translate in an increase o f 1.6% in the probability of 
using the exception, i.e., such an institution would use it for 20% of its contracts). 
In column (3), the share of an institution’s transactions done with a particular 
provider is now negative, while its interaction with corruption is positive and 
nearly significant at the 10% level. Again comparing with Table 2.1, the effect is 
9 times larger for an institution at the top of the corrupt scale: for one additional 
standard deviation above the sample mean, this institution now has 120% more 
contracts by exception than the sample mean, i.e., it would use it for 38% of its 
total purchases with that firm.
Table 2.2: Exceptional purchase determinants and institution-level corruption
De.p. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (0) (7) (8) (9)
E xc. Purchase Matched goods sample only Full sample ‘2004-2005 only
Procurement/Nat.ProdjA, 1.026* 0.838* 0.813*
(0.472) (0.398) (0.405)
Corruption 0.0212 0.0119* 0/234***
(0.017) (0.00617) (0.0412)
Firmjnstit.val -0.0381 0.0245 -0.096
(0.0681) (0.0209) (0.0555)
Valjj_corrupt 0.0198** 0.00354 0.0270***
(0.00866) (0.00429) (0.00838)
Instit_firm-val-share -0.0385 -0.148 -0.151
(0.284) (0.103) (0.148)
Share,-valÿ .corrupt 0.124 0.0746* 0.0605
(0.0808) (0.0411) (0.0443)
Finns F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instit. F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Goods F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instit*years F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5435 5435 5435 15640 15640 15640 3474 3474 3474
R-squared 0.692 0.712 0.712 0.582 0.602 0.602 0.605 0.609 0.608
Robust standard errors ¡11 parentheses, clustered a t the institution level. * p <  0.1, ** p <  0.05, p < 0.01
Note: valij.corrupt =  interaction (iim i.in stit.v a l* institution corruption index); See Table 2.1 notes for other definitions.
In columns (4) to (6), we perform robustness checks on the whole sample, 
and in columns (7) to (9) we use the 2004-2005 subsample. Corruption alone 
is now strongly significant. In the 2004-2005 subsample, a 1 point increase in 
the 10 points scale implies a 23% increase in the probability that the excep­
tion is used. The interaction terms are again as expected. In column (6), the 
in stit-firm jvaL sh a reijkt variable is negative, while its interaction with corrup­
tion is positive and significant at the 10% level, and it is also nearly so in column
effects. W hen introducing interactions, we prefer to control for these fixed effects rather than 
just for corruption, as they capture the whole set of institution-year unobserved effects.
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(9). In column (8), the firnri-institjvalijkt variable is negative, while its inter­
action with corruption is positive and significant at the 1% level. The marginal 
effects are comparable to those described above.
In the next Section, we show how this higher prevalence of corruption in 
sectors where public institutions are big clients, and with specific frequent sellers, 
distorts the profitability of firms.
2.7 The Profitability of Firms
The model second prediction is that, as a result of the corrupt practices unveiled 
above, entrepreneurs doing business with public institutions are more profitable 
than their counterparts serving private consumers. As a result, we expect the 
most able entrepreneurs to self-select into the more profitable procurement activ­
ities, as only they are efficient enough to afford both the entry cost to formality 
and the bribes to public officials.
2.7.1 Methodology
To test these effects, we first perform a reduced form analysis o f the effect on 
firms’ profits of a number o f variables, derived from the results in the previous 
section. As a proxy for the share of “favoured” contracts in the firm’s portfolio, we 
use the share of a firm’s contracts made through the exception, and the weighted 
average level of corruption of the institutions it deals with (where the weights are 
the share of the sales to these institutions in the firm’s total sales). In addition, 
we also use firms’ amount and number o f contracts.
The amount of taxes paid provides a reasonable approximation for profits 
because the tax rate on gains is flat and uniform in each period (30% in 2004, 
20% in 2005, 10% in 2006 and 2007). While the inclusion of other taxes (among 
which custom duties are by far the largest component) introduces some noise in 
the mapping between profits and taxes paid, we control for total imports in all 
estimations to minimise this issue. The model we want to estimate is:
Gu =  ot +  f3iZit +  fiiMit +  Xitfi3 +  9t +  Eu, (2.9)
where Git denotes the net gains o f firm i in year t, Zit is the variable o f interest 
(alternatively, the share of sales through the exception, average corruption of 
buyers, total sales to the state, number of contracts), M it is the total amount 
imported, X it is a vector o f control variables, and 9t are time fixed effects.
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However, the income tax and other taxes are amalgamated in the tax data, 
so we only observe:
Tit = xtGit +  SiMn +  Un, (2-10)
where x t =  0.3 for 2004, x t =  0.2 for 2005, and x t =  0.1 for 2006 and 2007. In 
order to obtain the firms’ net gains we therefore divide the total amount paid in 
taxes by the corresponding tax rates.
The distribution o f profits resulting from the available data is truncated at a 
strictly positive point. Moreover, the set of firms for which we have non-zero tax 
data is not constant over time. This forces us to restrict the panel to the subset 
of strictly positive tax observations.30 As a result, we obtain an unbalanced panel 
of 2167 observations across 4 years for 1017 private firms.
Using this sample, we test the following specification:
Tu/xt — a + PiZit +  (/?2 +  Si/xt)Mu +  XnP3 +  0t +  £u +  - , (2 -11)
X t
under the assumption that Zit is uncorrelated with uit.
One worry is that unobserved firm characteristics might be correlated both 
with the amount of taxes paid and with some of the Zit variables on the right 
hand side.31 For example, more efficient entrepreneurs might be more successful 
in general, hence pay more taxes, and also win more procurement contracts or 
be more frequently favoured through exception because o f their good reputation. 
Another concern is related to firm size. Indeed, bigger firms may have larger 
overall profits and also be in a better position to win procurement contracts or 
to respond to emergency calls from public institutions. To address such issues, 
we add firm level fixed effects 9i to (2.11), exploiting the panel dimension o f the 
data to wash out any time invariant firm-level unobserved characteristics.32
30Using all the observations to measure the variations in net gains, we would have some 
positive measurement errors (when a firm’s tax observation is out of the sample and therefore 
set at zero for one year and is positive the following one), some negative ones (in the reverse 
case), and more generally errors going either way for firms that do not make it to the ranking 
of top taxpayers.
31Note however that such endogeneity concerns are much less obvious for variables such as 
the average level of corruption.
32W e do not have additional firm-level data to control for such general characteristics. Fixed 




The results in Table 2.3 support our hypotheses. Column (1) shows that firms 
profits are significantly increasing in the share o f its contracts made by exceptional 
purchase. The average marginal effect implies that a 1 percent increase in the 
share of contracts made by exception corresponds to Gs. 28 millions (US$ 5,600) 
additional profits.
In column (2), the correlation between the average level of corruption o f public 
buyers and firms’ profitability is positive but only nearly significant at conven­
tional levels, which is not surprising given that the sample size is reduced to 261 
since corruption indices are not available for all institutions.
Table 2.3: Procurement and profitability of firms
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
G a in R andom  Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Im ports 0 .0 0 1 *** 0 .0 0 3 *** 0 .0 0 0 *** 0 .0 0 0 ***
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Exports 0 .0 0 0 ** -0 .0 2 4 0 .0 0 1 ** 0 .0 0 1 **
(0 .000) (0 .021) (0 .000) (0 .000)




Am ount sold 0 .2 9 3 ***
(0 .108)
Num ber of contracts 0 .1 5 4 **
(0 .062)
T im e F .E . Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms F .E . No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 476 261 2167 2167
R-squared 0.46 0.66 0.25 0.25
Hausm an chi2 0.4 0 0 0
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the institution level. * p <  0.1, ** p <  0.05, *** p <  0.01 
Note: All data adjusted for yearly price variations. In each case, we test the appropriateness of 
the random versus the fixed effect model, using the standard Hausman test. We report only the 
specification supported by the test.
Finally, in columns (3) and (4), we look directly at the correlation between 
firms’ profits and their procurement activity. The coefficients o f both the amounts 
sold and the number of contracts are positive and significant. In terms of marginal 
effects, every additional Gs. sold to the state translates into a Gs. 0.29 increase 
in profits, i.e., a rate o f return on procurement operations of nearly 29%, while 
a firm obtaining an additional contract increases its profits by Gs. 154 millions
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(approx. US$ 30,800).33
A technical concern has to do with tax evasion. Indeed, it is likely that 
Paraguayan firms do not report all of their sales for tax purpose, possibly biasing 
our estimations. One could think that sales to the State, because they are publicly 
registered, imply lower rates of evasion than other sales, in which case we may 
be facing an upward bias in our estimations. However, strong anecdotal evidence 
does suggest that well-connected firms use their influence to evade a bigger share 
of their tax obligations. Large state providers exploit loopholes in the tax system, 
in particular the fact that in Paraguay there is not tax on personal gains, to 
transfer firms’ benefits to non-taxable kind of revenues. This leads us to think 
that our estimates should be considered as a lower bound on the true returns of 
these firms.
These results, together with those of the previous Section showing that corrup­
tion looms larger in sector with important public purchases, imply that average 
profitability should be higher in sectors with an important procurement com po­
nent. In turn, this is likely to distort firms’ incentives and induce additional entry 
of potential entrepreneurs into these sectors. Next, we provide evidence o f this 
self-selection process.
2.7.3 Misallocation of Talents
An important point o f the model is that firms’ unobserved attributes (entrepreneurial 
or networking skills, efficiency, etc.) should explain part o f their increased prof­
itability due to a self-selection process. Some o f the best entrepreneurs are at­
tracted to sectors where they can benefit from the corrupt allocation o f procure­
ment contracts, resulting in a misallocation o f talents in the economy.
The following test explicitly addresses the process o f self-selection into the 
procurement sector, using a procedure proposed by W ooldridge (2002, p 631) to 
correct for the failure of the ignorability-of-treatment assumption.34 This entails 
estimating first a Probit model to explain the fact that firms intervene in the 
procurement sector or not:
1 \Xi ~  +  XiQi +  Sid2 +  ej >  0], (2.12)
where T* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm sells to public institutions at
33Results not shown here to save space indicate that the results in columns (1) and (2) are 
robust to systematically controlling for the amounts of linns’ sales to the State.
34Fafchamps and La Ferrara (2009) apply this technique to control for individuals’ self­
selection into self-help groups based on unobservable characteristics.
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any point during the sample period, X i is a vector of firm-level observables, and 
Si is a set of instruments. From (2.12), we derive 0, the predicted density and 
$ , the corresponding predicted cumulative density. We then estimate, for each 
year, the following tobit model:
Git =  max 0, a  +  f3\ Zit +  Xit(3 2 +  (1 — Y¿) ^  +  £u$  1 -  $
(2.13)
Remember that G it denotes the net gains of firm i in year t, Zit is either total 
firm’s sales to the state or its total number of contracts, and X it is a vector of 
control variables. We are interested in the statistical significance of the two last 
regressors, as an indication of self-selection, as well as in how their inclusion will 
affect the coefficient /3i.
The crucial point is the availability of suitable instruments, that would predict 
access to the procurement sector, while being excludable from the second stage. 
To generate instruments, we exploit the fact that apart from raising the cost 
of procurement and changing the identity of sellers, corruption also distorts the 
sectorial abundance of firms. We capture this bias by exploiting firms’ names, 
which are specific to the procurement categories where a large number of firms are 
active (see ranking in Figure A .l) .  First, there is a large number o f contracts in 
office and machinery categories sold by commercial intermediaries; locally, these 
are often nicknamed “suitcase firms” , because they specialise in importing and 
selling any item upon request.35 Next, many contracts are in the construction and 
maintenance categories. Finally, we also focus on services, which are generally 
provided by consulting firms.
For each o f these three groups, we define sets of related words and create three 
dummy variables, equal to one if at least one o f the specific words appears in the 
firms’ official denomination.36 The first stage shows that our instruments are 
very strong predictors of firms being active in procurement (see Appendix). Note 
that there is no reason to think that names influence firms’ profitability directly, 
supporting the excludability requirements.
Table 2.4 shows the results from estimating (2.13) on a sample of 12,759
35For example, one of the firms in our sample, run by a member of close circuit of the 
former president (also member of the M asonic loge and honorary consul o f an Eastern European  
country), won 301 contracts between 2004 and 2007, for close to $1.45m  worth o f office supplies, 
electric material, cooking utensils, textile, chemical products, cleaning products, com puting  
equipment, Paraguayan flags, etc.
36See the Appendix for the specific list of words used and descriptive statistics on these 
dummy variables.
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firms. For each year, we first display the results from a standard tobit estimation 
and then provide the results including self-selection correction terms, with boot­
strapped standard errors. Panel 1 uses the total volume of procurement contracts 
as our variable o f interest Zit, while panel 2 uses the total number o f contracts.
Table 2.4: Self-selection into procurement and firms’ profitability
P anel 1 ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7) (8 )
Dcp. Variable: G ains 2004 G ains 2005 G ains 2006 G ains 2007
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Volume o f contracts 0.009 0.008 0.041** 0.041 0.129*** 0.105 0.075*** 0.068
(0 .000) (0.019) (0.016) (0.034) (0.035) (0.141) (0.026) (0.159)
Import dummy 3.701*** 4.101*** 10.653*** 11.527*** 27.689*** 29.632*** 30.8*** 33.454***
(1.130) (1.315) (3.172) (3.855) (7.237) (8.087) (8.443) (9.323)
Import volume 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0.000)
Export dummy 1.387*** 1 44*** 4.173*** 4.658*** 25.662*** 29.741*** 17.759*** 17.168***
(0.512) (0.553) (1.402) (1.690) (7.185) (8.254) (5.610) (5.732)
Export volume 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001
(0 .000) (0.000) (0 .000) (0.000) (0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .000) (0 .001)
millsl 1.035*** 1.552*** 10.834*** 10.103***
(0.283) (0.470) (2.583) (2.465)
mills2 3.816*** 6.741*** 24.041*** 25.15***
(1.172) (2 .201) (6.138) (6.823)
Pseudo R2 0.185 0.232 0.275 0.289 0.133 0.162 0.156 0.178
Observations 12759 12759 12759 12759 12759 12759 12759 12759
P anel 2 ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7) (8 )
Dcp. Variable: G ains 2004 G ains 2005 G ains 2006 G ains 2007
Tobit Tobit. Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Number o f contracts 0.01 0.007 0.032** 0.026 0.27*** 0.187*** 0.256*** 0.15**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.024) (0.069) (0.061) (0.083) (0.072)
Import dummy 3.696*** 4.101*** 10.625*** 11.511*** 27.721*** 29.748*** 30.746*** 33.512***
(1.133) (1.386) (3.179) (3.634) (7.255) (7.935) (8.429) (9.360)
Import volume 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0 .000) (0.000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Export dummy 1.381*** 1.44** 4.148*** 4.653*** 25.895*** 29.942*** 17.438*** 17.196***
(0.514) (0.566) (1.412) (1.606) (7.235) (8.331) (5.541) (5.616)
Export volume 0.000 0.000 -0 .001* 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .000) (0 .001)
millsl 1.02*** 1.501*** 10.328*** 9.694***
(0.289) (0.486) (2.446) (2.312)
mills2 3.817*** 6.741*** 24.171*** 25.232***
(1.229) (2.063) (6.130) (6.751)
Pseudo R2 0.186 0.232 0.275 0.289 0.135 0.162 0.157 0.178
Observations 12759 12759 12759 12759 12759 12759 12759 12759
Robust, s tandard  errors in parentheses (bootstrapped w ith  500 replications w hen mills ratios are included). * p <  0.1. ** p  <  0.05. *** p  <  0.01 
Tobit specifications w ith  left, truncation  a t the lowest observed profit level in each year. For each specification, explanatory  variables 
correspond to  the relevant year.
The correction terms are strongly significant (at the 1% level) in all esti­
mations. Moreover, their inclusion systematically induces a reduction in the 
estimated coefficients of the variables o f interest. The marginal effect of firms’ 
contract volume on their profitability is reduced by between 9 and 19% (except 
in 2005, when it remains constant), and loses significance in the last three years. 
Similarly, the marginal effect o f the number o f contracts is reduced by between 
19 and 42%, and becomes insignificant in the 2005 sample.
We conclude that part of the link between procurement and firms’ profitabil­
ity relates to unobserved self-selection of entrepreneurs into activities that offer
31
privileged access to the procurement sector. This provides the final element of 
our story, in which would-be entrepreneurs are likely to be disproportionately 
attracted to sectors in which strong demand from corrupt public buyers generate 
opportunities for rent-seeking.
2.8 Conclusion
We have illustrated the fact that rent-seeking is costly to development, by showing 
how entrepreneurs’ economic incentives are distorted toward unproductive activ­
ities as the result o f favouritism in the allocation of public contracts in Paraguay. 
After building an industrial organisation model, we have used a large scale mi­
croeconomic database including all public procurement operations over a 4 year 
period to test the predictions of the model. In Paraguay, institutions with an 
important procurement activity are more likely to engage in corrupt dealings. As 
for firms, they have a greater probability o f obtaining a contract directly through 
an exceptional procedure from an institution with which they have a strong con­
tractual relation, both in terms of the total value and frequency o f transactions, 
particularly when dealing with more corrupt State entities.
We have also shown that firms trading more with the public sector are more 
profitable, even when controlling for their unobserved characteristics. This overall 
picture embodies the consequences of a systematic misallocation o f talents a la 
Murphy et al. (1991). In this sense, rent-seeking is particularly costly because it 
destroys the development potential of the best entrepreneurs.
Indeed, the Paraguayan entrepreneurial class is in its overwhelming majority 
imports-oriented, with over 90% of the top 500 taxpayers being importers. Over 
the decade 1996-2005, the commercial balance displayed an average deficit of 
8.5% of GDP. Large rents linked to the resale o f imported goods to the State 
and the historical absence o f an import-substitution strategy have contributed to 
make Paraguay one of the least industrialised economies in South America as, 
apart from the soybean and meat sectors, its entrepreneurs have systematically 
specialised in commercial intermediation, often with the public sector as sole 
client, rather than in production.37
The costs of this productive atrophy and biased specialisation are reflected in 
the poor record of economic growth. After a period of significant growth in the 
1970s and early 1980s, linked in particular to the massive construction projects
37This has also fuelled a flourishing and illegal reexportation business to the neighbours Brazil 
and Argentina. See M asi (2007) and Straub (1998) for more details on this.
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including the hydroelectric dams, the rate of growth o f per capita income was only 
0.8% in the 1980s and strictly negative after that (-0.1% and -0.6% in the 1990s 
and 2000s). Over the last two decades, the Paraguayan Central Bank indicates 
that 92% of growth fluctuations were due directly to fluctuation in agricultural 
production and exports. As a result, per capita income was lower in real terms 
in 2005 than it was at the beginning o f the 1980s.
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APPENDIX A
A .l The Model
A .1.1 Proof of proposition 2.1
Proof. The traditional method of production is less efficient than the modern 
method, so in the absence of an entry fee the informal sector disappears. Indeed, 
when F  =  0, the best technology prevails so that in equilibrium p* =  c =  0. 
However this outcome is upset when F  >  0, as firms need a mark-up to cover 
F. More generally let c G [ç, c]. Under competitive pressure the smallest possible 
price compatible with a firm breaking even is so that (p — c) (D(p )  +  =  F.
Setting ç  — 0 and D (p ) — A  — p yield p(A  — p) +  Q c =  F.  Solving this second 
order equation in p  we obtain pf * =  A/2 — y/A2/A +  Q c — F. In equilibrium 
formality prevails if pf* <  p1 =  c. Proposition 2.1 follows. ■
A .1.2 Proof of proposition 2.2 and of —̂ ■ <  0
Proof. Substituting cr(b) from (2.2), we get B  =  bcQ ^1 -  Under
the assumption that G(.) is convex, one can easily check that EB(b)  is concave 
in b G [0,1]. The first order condition is sufficient, so that the optimal bribe rate, 
denoted br , solves =  0. Proposition 2 .2  follows. ■
Proof. Let 0 =  ^  and let V(<f>,b) =  j ^ H g  It is straightforward to
check that under the assumption that G(x )  is increasing and convex, >  0.
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By virtue of Proposition 2.2, bG((f)) is such that: V(<f>,b) =  |. Since V  increases 
with b while £ decreases with b these functions cross only once. A sufficient 
condition for d l <  0 is that dVg ^  >  0 V6 € [0,1], which is equivalent to 
—Hg  +  i +4,H'g ( l+ ^ )  >  0 V6 e  [0,1]. A sufficient condition for the result
to hold is thus dlo9( Ĥ i + ^ )  >  _ L _  Y 6 £  [0 ,1], This technical condition depends 
on the distribution function G{x).  An example of function that meets the paper 
conditions is G { x ) =  x 2 \/x G [0,1]. One can check that dVQ̂ ’b~- >  0 is then 
equivalent to +  2 1 b̂ +b >  1 V6 £ [0,1]. Differentiating the left hand side of 
the inequality with respect to b it is straightforward to check that it is decreasing 
with b. We deduce that +  2 1+b+0+fe >  +  ‘2 1̂ + i  =  L Computing the
optimal bribe rate we get: br — | +  l )2 +  1 — 2^. ■
A .1.3 Proof of proposition 2.3
Proof. Let k  =  £ [0,1). Let ß[b) =  £ [k,1]. Let HG(x) =
(respectively HF(x) =  y r ^ y )  be the hazard rate function associated to the 
distribution function G(x )  (respectively F ( x ) )  Vx £ [0,1]. Then, by virtue of 
equation (2.3), ßG =  ß(bG) is such that y G^ r ) =  ß c  — while ß rF is such that 
) =  ßF — k. Under the assumption that the distribution functions are 
convex the inverse of the hazard rate function, y^ppj and Hg^  , are decreasing in 
x. Moreover HG(ß) <  H F(ß ) implies \/ß £ [k , 1], We deduce that
ßG >  ßp  which implies brG >  brF. m
A. 1.4 Proof of proposition 2.4
P ro o f. Let <fi =  Substituting bG((fi), implicitly defined by equation (2.3), 
in equation (2.2) yields cr(cj)) as defined in proposition 2.4. In the formal pro­
ductive sector, under the pressure of competition the best available technology 
prevails. The price in the formal economy is such that (p — cr (0 )) D(p) =  F  
which is equivalent to {p -  cr(cj)))(A -  p) — F.  Rearranging yields: - p2 +  
[A +  cr(</>)]p — [F  +  Acr(4>)] — 0. Solving this second degree equation in p 
yields the value of the price in the formal sector (i.e., the lowest root): p f =  
| A +  cr ((/))- \ j [ A -  cr(0 ) ]2 -  4F  . Finally the formal productive sector prevails 
in equilibrium if and only if pf  <  p1 =  c. One can check after some computations 
that this is equivalent to equation (2.6).
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Finally we check that ^  >  0. Let qr =  We deduce that: ^  —
ft? dC<i^ cm>)2 • Substituting the derivative o f <fi =  by its value jq=j =  -Q-, this 
is equivalent to : (c r{</>) +  • We deduce that ^  >  0 if >
By virtue of equation (2.2) we have +  0 ) -  (1 -  &£(</>))) •
We deduce that %  >  0 if ( - ^ ( 1  +  4>) -  (1 -  &&(0))) >  
which is equivalent to — db- j^  (1 +  (f))(p >  —(1 — brG((/))). A sufficient condition is 
that <  0. ■
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A .2 Procurement Data
Figure A1 shows the distribution o f total volume and total number o f contracts, 
as well as total number of firms active by categories o f goods and services.
Figure A .l: Distribution of contracts and firms by types o f goods













A .2.1 Legal requirements for public procurement purchases
The 2.051/03 law of Public Procurement aims to promote competition among 
state providers and transparency in the procurement process. To this end, it 
regulates purchases differently according to their value.
The largest contracts (above 10,000 mdw; see Table A .l  below) are made 
through a Public Tendering. Calls for offers on such contracts must be published 
in the national press for a minimum of three days on top of the usual publica­
tion in the official newsletter and web site. The requirements and criteria for 
evaluation must be restricted to technically indispensable requisites. Grounds for 
disqualification must concern the failure to comply with substantial requisites, 
such as threatening the legality or solvency of the proposal. In this way calculus 
mistakes or mistakes in the layout of the offer, which were often used to justify
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dismissal of an offer are no longer considered valid grounds. If two or more offers 
comply with the technical requirements, the offer with the lowest price wins. Bids 
and the winning offer are published on the web site.
The competitive bidding process (between 2,000 and 10,000 mdw) does not 
require a call for offers in the national press. However five different firms have to 
make offers and the call must be published on the web for any firm who might 
qualify to participate in the bidding.
When the value o f the contract does not reach 2,000 mdw, the contracting 
institution can allocate the contract directly to a firm without organising an 
auction. It must however have published the call on the official web site and 
have received at least three official offers from different firms, contracts worth 
less than 20 mdw a ‘ fixed funds’ mechanism was created to allow institutions to 
purchase directly from a single supplier without justification. This mechanism 
has no specific requirement on the number o f offers or publication o f the call for 
offers. We include it as a direct purchase.
Finally, in order to bypass costly administrative procedures in cases o f “force 
majeure” , the exceptional purchase mechanism described in the text was created. 
Under this regime, institutions can purchase as much as they want from a firm 
of their choice. The law stipulates that a report explaining the reasons of the 
purchase and justifying the choice o f provider should be supplied to the national 
watchdog within a month after the date of purchase. In practice, this is rarely 
done.
Table A .l summarises the evolution of the Paraguayan minimum daily wage, 
the Guarani/US$ exchange rate, and the value of the thresholds defined above in 
US$.
Table A .l: Minimum daily wage, exchange rate and procurement thresholds
Until April 2004 April 2004 to March March 2006 to Since September
2006 September 2007 2007
Mdw in Gs. Gs. 37,401 Gs. 41 889 Gs. 46 $15 Gs. 51,607
Mdw in US$ 6.28 6.78 - 7.47 8 3 7  - 9.34 10.28
Exchange rate Gs. 5,608 < 1$ < G s. Gs. 5,021 < 1$ < G s.
bounds 1 $ = G s. 5,955 6,178 5,608 1$ = G s . 5,021
Procurement thrediolds (US$)
20 mdw 125.6 1 3 5 .6 -  149.4 1 6 7 .4 - 186.8 205.6
2$00 mdw 12560 13 560  -  14,940 1 6 ,7 4 0 - 18,680 20560
10,000 mdw 62,800 67,800 -  74,700 83,700 -  93,400 100,280
Note: Average exchange rate provided by B C P  (Paraguay Central Bank), 1US$ =  
Gs. 5955 in 2004, 1 US$ =  G s.6178 in 2005, 1US$ =  Gs. 5608 in 2006, 1 U S$ =  
G s.5021 in 2007.
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A .2.2 Institution corruption data
There are three tentative measures of corruption: the news index, which counts 
the number of newspaper articles referring to corruption cases involving each 
specific institution, published in the 3 main national newspapers each year; the 
control index, based on the Comptroller General’s (the “contraloria” ) evaluation 
of each institution; and the trial index, summarising the number o f outstanding 
administrative corruption cases in any given administration. We rescale all indices 
on a 0-10 scale, with 10 representing more corruption. The appeal o f these indices, 
contrary to those based on perceptions o f corruption, is the objectivity o f the 
criteria used to construct them. More importantly, our theory calls for a measure 
of the probability o f detection at the institution level, which is well captured by 
these indices as they are widely advertised.
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A .3 Empirical Evidence. Complements
A .3.1 Descriptive statistics on the relationship between 
institution budget size, corruption and contracts 
size
The model predicts that public institutions with larger procurement budgets con­
tract with more firms ( >  0) and that their providers get larger contracts 
( %  >  »)•
For the 230 institution-year data points available, Table A .2 displays the em­
pirical correlations between institutions total budget and average contract size, 
total number o f contracts and of providers, as well as the level o f corruption for 
the subset o f 37 institution-year pairs available. The correlations between total 
budget and the first three variables are all positive and strongly significant, in­
dicating that institutions with bigger procurement budgets do indeed offer more 
and larger lots to a larger pool of providers. Moreover, the average index o f cor­
ruption (computed as the arithmetic mean o f the indices defined above) displays 
the expected positive correlation, supporting the idea that large buyers are more 
corrupt (although the correlation is not significant due to the reduced sample 
size).
Table A .2: Institution-level correlations
Average Number of Number of Corruption
contract size contracts providers measures
Institution total budget 0.95a 0.18a 027“ 0.19
N 230 230 230 37
a Significant at the 1% level.
A .3.2 Self-selection dummies (Section 2.7.3)
We construct three dummy variables, equal to one if at least one o f the specific 
keywords appears in the firms’ official denomination and zero otherwise. The 
keywords are chosen so as to match standard names used by firms in the relevant 
sectors of activities (allowing for variations such as abbreviations):
• “Im port-export” dummy: ferretería, comercial, distribuidora, casa, repre­
sentación, servicio, supply, venta, supermercado, material, pieza, trade, im­
port, export.
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• “Construction and maintenance” dummy: ingeniero, arquitecto, mecanico, 
taller, repuesto.
• “Consulting” dummy: abogado, auditor, consultor, associados, asesor, com ­
munication.
Table A .3 shows how these categories o f firms are represented among state 
providers and non state providers respectively. Concerning excludability, as 
stated in the text, there is no reason why firms’ names would influence their 
profitability directly, other than through the nature o f their branch o f activity 
(the “construction” and “consultancy” dummies are actually negatively corre­
lated with firm-level gains). The “im port-export” dummy can be discussed on 
the ground that it may affect profitability through a distinct channel, namely the 
fact that firms in these activities could also be benefiting from the widespread 
smuggling rents available in the Paraguayan economy. To address this concern, 
we rerun the estimations excluding this variable from the set of instruments. Re­
sults, not shown here to save space, are identical to those in Table 2.4. Table A .4 
presents the first stage estimations, including respectively the three instruments 
or only the last two.
Table A .3: Distribution of self-selection dummies
State providers 0 1 Total
Impexp
0 7,035 (97.1%) 4,170(75.7%) 11,745
Construct
1 213(2.9%) 801 (24.3%) 1)014
0 7,224(99.7%) 4,983 (90.4%) 12,207
Consult
1 24(03%) 528 (9.6%) 552
0 7246 (99.97%) 5,277 (95.8%) 12,523
1 2(0.03%) 234 (4.2%) 236
Total 7248 5311 12,759
Note: In each cell, the number in parenthesis indicates the share of firms with or 
without the name attribute, as a percentage o f the total of firms in the category 
(state provider or not). For example, firms in the ’’ im pexp” category represent 2 .9 %  
(2 1 3 /7 2 4 8 ) of non state providers, and 24 .3 %  (8 0 1 /5 5 1 1 ) o f state providers.
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Pseudo R2 033 031
Observations 12759 12759
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * * *  significant at 1% .
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C H A P T E R  3
Political Manipulation in the 
Enforcement of Labour Regulations
Abstract
Increasingly, the literature on labour regulation is turning to the de 
facto implementation of employment laws to understand their economic 
effects, rather than simply analysing their de jure provisions. This chapter 
takes a political economy look into the space between labour institutions 
and implementation. In the context of Brazil, several recent studies have 
found evidence of political manipulation in regulatory enforcement and fis­
cal transfers. The chapter sets out to assess whether labour regulations are 
arbitrarily enforced according to political motivations, to identify the polit­
ical channel for interference, and to determine whether labour sanctions are 
used as a clientelistic tool to sway voters. A unique dataset of all fines im­
posed by labour inspectors in two of Brazil’s largest states, matched with 
data on electoral results at municipal, state and federal levels over a 12 
year period, is used to test for evidence of political manipulation. Towns 
with a large presence of voters loyal to the governor receive fewer fines 
on average, but the pattern of sanctioning does not vary over the electoral 
cycle. While governors may be able to exert some pressure over the inspec­
torate, labour sanctions are not manipulated for electoral motives in Brazil.
Key words: Electoral Politics, Intergovernmental Relations, Bureau­
crats, Regulation;
JEL codes: D73, D78, H77, Q28.
3.1 Introduction
It is widely advocated in the political economy literature that regulations be 
drawn up by elected officials but implemented by an independent bureaucracy, 
in order to shelter enforcement from short term political considerations.1 In 
practice however bureaucrats are rarely immune from the influence o f politicians, 
especially when appointed by them. As a consequence regulatory enforcement 
can be arbitrary, with the de facto regulatory environment varying according to 
politicians’ interests. In the context of labour market regulations, enforcement 
has been shown to have a significant impact on compliance as well as on firms’ 
productivity, employment and output.2 Hence whether the implementation of 
labour regulations is politically influenced has important economic implications. 
Moreover, if sanctions are used to sway voters in election years this will also 
distort electoral competition, increasing the likelihood that corrupt officials are 
reelected and that the public good is underprovided as a consequence.3 Brazil is 
a particularly relevant setting for such a study as it has one o f the most regulated 
labor markets in the world and over 40% of its workforce is employed in the 
informal sector.4 Moreover, a substantial body o f empirical research, reviewed 
below, finds ample evidence o f political interference in the Brazilian bureaucracy 
and manipulation o f fiscal policies.
This chapter investigates whether political factors influence the allocation of 
fines for infractions of labour law in Brazil. The empirical analysis sets out 
firstly to evaluate the influence o f (i) partisan alignment between different levels 
of government, (ii) electoral competition levels, and (iii) the presence of term 
limits, on the issuance of fines for labour infractions at a town level. Secondly, 
these political variables are interacted with dummies for election years to assess 
whether the pattern in sanctioning reflects a clientelist strategy aimed at swaying 
voters during election times. Each consideration is tested using a unique panel 
dataset including all fines distributed for infractions o f labour regulations at a 
town level in two o f Brazil’s largest and most industrialised states over a 12-year 
period.
Manipulation o f the enforcement of labour regulations for electoral purposes 
has been documented in other countries5 and was surmised in particular by
^ e e  for exam ple M cC ubbins et al. (1987), Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008) and Maskin  
and Tirole (2004).
2See Alm eida and Carneiro (2009).
3See Vicente and W anlchekon (2009).
4The W orld B ank’s Doing Business dataset places Brazil third in the world in terms of labor 
regulation strictness. See also Bank (2004); Botero et al. (2004).
5See for exam ple Ronconi (2010) who exploits the existence of an electoral cycle in the
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Tendler (2002) in the context of Brazil. The results of the present analysis how­
ever suggest that labour sanctions are at most marginally influenced by political 
interests, but there is no evidence for their use to sway voters. Indeed, the num­
ber of fines issued is not affected by electoral cycles. It is found to be on average 
slightly lower in those towns where the governor received most votes in the pre­
vious election, but mayors’ and the president’s local political interests are found 
to have no impact on the allocation o f fines. This is in line with the institutional 
analysis presented in Section 2, which identifies the state-level inspectorate direc­
tors, who are nominated upon recommendation from state governors, as the most 
likely channel for political influence. However the magnitude o f the effect is very 
small and the partisan alignment o f local politicians with state governors has no 
robustly significant impact on the distribution of fines. Moreover, no evidence is 
found that labour sanctions are allocated tactically in order to sway voters. On 
an efficiency note, the election of a new governor is found to have a highly disrup­
tive effect on the work o f regional inspectorates, as the number o f fines issued in 
a state in a governor’s first term is significantly smaller than in his second term.
The empirical analysis uses the number of sanctions to proxy for enforcement 
and not the number o f inspections for which data are not available. Since there 
are no town-level data on the infraction rate either, the variation in the number of 
sanctions may be due to changes in firms’ compliance with labour law, changes in 
the number of inspections or changes in the rate at which inspected firms found 
to be non-compliant are sanctioned. Various provisions are taken to identify 
the latter effect. Firstly, town Fixed Effects are included in all regressions to 
control for time-invariant town heterogeneities in the level o f compliance due 
for example to the different industries implanted in different towns. Secondly, 
a variable measuring town population annually and a time trend are included 
in all regressions to control for changes in the inspection rate, as the staffing of 
inspectorates is calculated on the basis o f population and industrial activity and 
has trended upwards over the period. Thirdly a measure of labour informality at 
the state level allows to control somewhat for economic fluctuations that cause 
compliance levels to vary overtime.
This chapter tests various predictions about the political manipulation o f gov­
ernment resources made by the theoretical political economy literature and iden­
tified in various contexts by the empirical literature on Brazil. The favouring 
of towns where mayors are aligned with the governor’s or president’s party is
staffing of labour inspectorates in Argentina to proxy for enforcement in his study of the effects 
of enforcement on compliance.
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analysed in Grossman (1994)’s model in which the central politician transfers 
resources to local politicians in exchange for their support during the next elec­
tion. One mechanism the central politician can use to increase the enforcement 
of this political deal is to favour local politicians that belong to the same political 
party. An example o f such behaviour is found by Brollo and Nannicini (2010) in 
the context of infrastructure transfers to municipal governments in Brazil. More­
over, the literature on distributive politics describes ways in which politicians can 
use public resources to increase their re-election chances. A  “core voter m odel” 
proposed by Cox and McCubbins (1986) shows that risk averse politicians can 
optimally boost their electoral support by rewarding core supporter groups. Al­
ternatively, Dixit and Londregan (1996) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) argue 
that a better strategy to maximise reelection chances is to target “swing voters” 
who are close to ideological indifference between two parties. The most common 
method used in the literature to test for the existence o f such strategies, also used 
in the present analysis, is to consider constituencies where the last election was 
won by a large m ajority as “core voter” groups and those where the incumbent 
politician faced a tight electoral race as “swing voter” constituencies. This is the 
approach followed for example by Ferraz (2007), who finds that the number of 
environmental licenses released in the state o f Sao Paulo is higher during state 
election years in towns where the governor won by a large majority. Whilst most 
of the research in the empirical political economy literature focuses on the polit­
ical manipulation o f fiscal transfers,6 few, such as Ferraz (2007) look at political 
interference in the implementation of regulations. The present analysis provides 
an alternative reference point for estimates of the extent of political manipulation 
of implementation in the context of labour regulations.
This chapter also contributes to the empirical literature on corruption, par­
ticularly studies o f favouritism of politically aligned firms by public institutions.' 
Although the industrial organisation consequences of selective regulatory enforce­
ment are not measured here, a reduction in sanctions is likely to give certain firms 
a competitive advantage based solely on their political connections and hence be 
nefarious for allocative efficiency.
Finally, this chapter also relates to the literature on labour regulations in 
developing countries.8 It investigates an important aspect of the regulation of
6See for exam ple Arulam palam  et al. (2009); Brollo and Nannicini (2010); Ferreira and 
Burgarin (2005); Cam acho and Conover (2009); Finan (2004).
7See for example Auriol et al. (2011) in the context of public procurement contracts, Khwa.ja 
and M ian (2005) on access to public bank loans, or Hsieh et al. (2011) on the discriminatory 
treatment of firms that supported the opposition to Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.
8See Alm eida and Carneiro (2009); Bertola et al. (2000); Boeri and Jimeno (2005); Boeri
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labour, which can interfere with the relation between de jure provisions and labour 
market outcomes, namely the underlying political economic factors behind the 
enforcement of labour regulations.
The paper is structured in the following way: Section 1 analyses the institu­
tional context and Section 2 the political context; the data are then described 
in Section 3 and Section 4 explains the empirical methodology; finally, Section 5 
presents and interprets the results and concludes.
3.2 Labour regulation and enforcement
3.2.1 Institutional structure of the Labour Inspection Sec­
retariat
The Labour Inspection Secretariat (SIT) is one o f the four offices directly below 
the Minister’s office in the Labour and Employment Ministry (M TE). It is com ­
posed of a central office in the federal capital Brasilia and 27 decentralised units 
that are also directly subordinate to the Minister. The 27 Regional Labour and 
Employment Superintendencies o f (SRTE, Superintendencia Regionais do Tra- 
balho e Emprego) are located in each of the 26 states plus the Federal District. 
These support and monitor the work of the labour inspectors who work from 114 
Subregional Labour Offices (GR, Gerencia Regional) and 480 smaller agencies 
(Agenda Regional), each having jurisdiction over constituencies o f one or more 
municipalities. The positions o f power within the inspectorate’s institutions are 
politically strategic, not least because employment and labour rights in particular 
are key electoral issues in Brazil. The Head of the Labour Inspection Secretariat 
(SIT, Secretaría de Inspegáo do Trabalho) is in control o f a large bureaucracy that 
reaches into all parts o f the country, and is in part responsible for the enforce­
ment o f taxes that represent a significant share o f the federal budget. There has 
been a move towards greater organisational autonomy, more resources, and higher 
professionalisation in the upper echelons of the Secretariat since the mid 1990s. 
For example, the past four heads o f the SIT have been career inspectors - rather 
than political appointees as was previously the case. But whilst in theory the 
institutional organisation of the inspectorate and bureaucrats’ work has moved 
towards greater autonomy from politicians’ influence, in practice anecdotal evi­
dence as well as official reports paint the picture o f an overstretched bureaucracy
et al. (2008); Botero et al. (2004); Djankov and Ram alho (2009); Heckman and Pagés (2004) 
for key recent inputs in the research on the labour market im pacts of regulation in developing 
countries and the importance of looking at enforcement.
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that lacks the resources to fully enjoy the extent o f its official autonomy.9
There are currently 2,99710 labour inspectors (A F T , Auditor-Fiscal do Tra- 
balho) in Brazil, a figure that is widely recognised to be far too low, as each 
inspector is on average responsible for 32 thousand potential workers and 2,470 
firms.11 The allocation of resources to regional offices is decided centrally by the 
Ministry o f Labour following a simple rule that takes into account the population 
of the area, its estimated informal employment rate depending on the size and 
sector o f firms operating there, and the industrial activity.12 Two inspectors are 
allocated per geographical area within each SRTE’s circumscription and are ran­
domly rotated every twelve months so as to minimise the chances that they are 
captured by local elites. These are supplemented by mobile task forces that cut 
across geographical areas to implement special enforcement programs where they 
are most needed. The Decree 4,552/02 o f the new Labour Inspection Regulation 
deepened the autonomy of labour inspectors by subordinating them directly to 
the federal authority.13 Yet although this decree grants them the power to inspect 
and issue a Notice o f Infraction to any firm within the geographic area o f their 
agency, the volume o f denunciations received and the limited resources available 
to the agencies means that inspections are rarely direct visits to randomly se­
lected firms.14 Instead, inspectors are generally told which firms to inspect. Such 
a situation of excess demand may leave space for a two-speed system involv­
ing a regional-level selection o f the cases investigated based on political criteria. 
Moreover whilst the career of Labour Inspector is highly professionalized, the 
directors of the regional SRTEs who have a key role in determining the issuance 
of sanctions to firms remain politically appointed by the state governor. The 
next subsection describes the heavy regulatory burden faced by firms, and the 
procedures for issuing sanctions.
9See Magalhaes (2012).
10Information from June 2010 available on the ILO  website.
11 This estim ate is based on estim ates of the active population -  95 million - and number of 
economic entities -  7.4 million -  from the 2009 R A IS  dataset available on the IB G E  website.
12However, just as Alm eida and Carneiro (2009), I do not know the details of this formula.
13See Cardoso and Lage (2005).
14According to a Labour M inistry document (2004:7 , reported in Cardoso and Lage (2005)):
“The greatest source o f information that, in compliance with the priorities laid out 
in planning, will guide inspection activities are the denunciations filed by labour 
unions, the Public Labor Ministry, other governmental and nongovernmental bod­
ies, and workers themselves, who turn to Inspection Auditors from the Regional 
Labor Office daily.” .
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3.2.2 Labour regulations and sanctions
Brazilian labour law burdens employers with substantial regulations and manda­
tory contributions. Employers are responsible for registering workers’ employ­
ment on a work permit which entitles workers to wage and non-wage benefits 
paid for by the employer. These include retirement benefits, unemployment in­
surance, and contribution to a severance pay fund, the FGTS (Employment Du­
ration Guarantee Fund), which requires the payment o f 8% of the monthly salary 
into a bank account that is accessible to the employee in case of unfair dismissal. 
These mandatory non-wage benefits amount to 85% of workers’ net wage,15 pric­
ing low productivity workers out o f the formal labour market and contributing 
to the widespread avoidance o f labour law. The informality rate in Brazil rose 
from 40% in 1980 to 60% in 1990.16 Beside the Brazilian Labour Code (CLT, 
Consolidagao das Leis do Trabalho), which includes 922 contractual regulations, 
employers also bear the capital cost of abiding by the more than 2000 rules of 
the Health and Safety Code. Yet despite such generous provisions for workers’ 
welfare, abuse is reportedly widespread and apart from certain areas of infrac­
tion, such as child or slave labour which special task forces have been effective at 
tackling, most firms get away with it unpunished.17
Inspectors have discretion in their response to infractions, provided these do 
not pose a significant threat to workers’ health. In the event that they decide 
to issue a fine, inspectors must first give a Notice of Infraction within 24 hours 
of the inspection, after which the firm then has ten days to present its defence. 
It is then the director of the regional SRTE who ultimately has the authority to 
decide on the imposition or not of a fine, and on its amount, within guidelines 
set by the law for the amount by which each type o f infraction is punishable.
Once a fine is issued the firm can appeal to the central inspectorate office 
in the Federal District. This is common, particularly in the case o f large firms, 
and because o f the scarce resources dedicated to treating such cases, the judi­
cial procedure takes years to come to a decision. As a result, a great majority 
of sanctioned employers end up evading their fines by closing down the firm.18 
Nonetheless, fines still carry substantial costs for both employers and employees. 
In the period of study, firms were compelled to make a deposit of the full value of 





19This requirement was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Federal Court in February
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visit o f an inspector and subsequent redress of their working conditions represents 
a welfare gain, it is not clear that the imposition of a line upon inspection also 
does, as its likely short term consequence is a combination o f job  loss or firm 
closure. In the analysis presented in the next section, the dependent variable 
used in all regressions is not the number of inspections but the number of fines 
imposed. This leads me to interpret reductions in the number of fines as a short 
term favour for voters, where as it is not obvious that interference in the actual 
inspection of firms would be amenable to the same interpretation.
During the period o f study, the institutional structure o f the SIT has moved 
significantly towards providing more autonomy to labour inspectors and shel­
tering them from local and federal political interests. In practice however, it is 
argued that malpractice by employers is still widespread and mostly left unpun­
ished, particularly in the case of large firms. Moreover, the scope for political 
interference remains present at the state level, through the Regional Superinten­
dent who is nominated by the state governor and whose actions may therefore be 
dictated by the governor’s political interests. Whilst potential mechanisms and 
incentives for political manipulation of the issuance o f sanctions are identifiable, 
the absence o f documentation o f such practices is notable. One explanation for 
this might be the absence o f a public database o f inspections or fines. Indeed, 
the dataset used in this analysis has to my knowledge never before been released, 
and due to the limited resources available to the inspectorates, the data are also 
scarcely used by inspectors to follow up on inspections.20
3.3 Electoral politics in Brazil
The president, state governors and town mayors are elected every four years, with 
the elections staggered at a two year interval. During the period of study, the 
state and federal executive were elected in 1998, 2002 and 2006, and three mu­
nicipal elections were held in 2000, 2004 and 2008. The electoral rules (including 
the election date) are the same throughout the country. President, governors and 
mayors are all elected through a dual-ballot plurality rule (runoff system), except 
in towns o f fewer than 200,000 inhabitants, where simple plurality rule applies for 
mayoral elections. Registering to vote and voting are compulsory for all citizens 
aged 18-70 under Brazilian law.
The period o f study covers four presidential mandates, two successive mandates
2010 .
20See M agalhaes (2012).
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of Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the centrist-right Brazilian Social Democracy 
Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB) from 1995 to 2002, fol­
lowed by Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabal- 
hadores, P T ) from 2003 to 2010. Although both parties enjoy large support in 
Sao Paulo, the state o f Sao Paulo has been governed by a PSDB governor since 
1994. This provides variation in the alignment o f state and federal level politi­
cians, with both executives ruled by the same PSDB party from 1995 to 2002, 
and a governor from the opposition PSDB during the P T  presidency of Lula from 
2003 to 2010. Similarly the state of Minas Gerais was ruled by the PSDB for the 
entire period, bar one term from 1999 to 2002 when the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro, PM DB) was in 
power.
The Brazilian constitution was amended in 1997 to allow two consecutive 
terms for executive posts, giving governors and the president the opportunity to 
run for re-election in for the first time in 1998 and mayors to stand for re-election 
in 2000. Therefore, during the 2001-2004 mandate mayors were in either of two 
positions - serving their first term with a potential re-election in the next term, 
or serving their second term and facing a binding term limit. This institutional 
change is exploited to identify whether mayors’ ability to repay a political favour, 
which depends on whether they can stand for reelection, affects the manipulation 
of fines in their municipalities. Municipal governments in Brazil are responsible 
for the provision of many public goods such as health, education, garbage services 
and transportation and as such receive large intergovernmental transfers from the 
federal government. Consequently, they wield significant political power, partic­
ularly in larger towns. The analysis will therefore look into political interference 
in the imposition of sanctions by governors to favour mayors who are politically 
aligned and test whether the ability to repay the favour during the next state 
election is a significant factor in the incidence of manipulation.
There is substantial evidence o f the use o f distributive transfers for electoral 
purposes in Brazil. Ferreira and Burgarin (2005) show that governors favour mu­
nicipalities ruled by a mayor o f their own party in the distribution o f voluntary 
intergovernmental transfers, while Finan (2004) shows that federal deputies tar­
get public investments from budgetary amendments for public works to reward 
municipalities for local electoral support. More relevant to this chapter because 
it focuses on regulatory manipulation, Ferraz (2007) finds that the issuance of en­
vironmental licences is targeted to municipalities based on patronage concerns in 
the state o f Sao Paulo. Environmental licenses are subject to political influence
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because they can be targeted at specific municipalities and have an important 
impact on job  creation, so they can be used to gain political support. Similarly, 
the sanctioning of firms following labour inspections involves substantial fines and 
can lead to the closure of firms and destruction of its employees’ job s .21 In the 
next section, the data and methodology used to establish this are presented.
3.4 Data and descriptive statistics
The empirical analysis makes use o f municipality-level data from all 1498 towns 
in Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais, two of the largest and most industrialised states 
in Brazil. The period o f study spans a twelve year period from 1997 to 2008, 
forming a panel with 17,976 observations.22
The data on labour sanctions were provided by the Labour Ministry (M TE, 
Ministerio de Trabalho e Emprego). For each town, the main variable is the 
annual total number of fines distributed to firms between 1997 and 2008 for 
several different types of infractions.23
Three mayoral elections (2000, 2004, 2008) and three gubernatorial and pres­
idential elections (1998, 2002, 2006) took place during the period o f study (see 
Appendix A  for a timeline). For each election, the electoral data obtained from 
the Superior Court of Electoral Justice ( TSE, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral) include 
candidates’ name and party, the vote share obtained in each municipality in each 
round of the election, the participation rate and size of the electorate. I use these 
data to construct three categories o f variables that represent towns’ political char­
acteristics. Firstly, two dummy variables are created that take value 1 when the 
mayor of a town is politically aligned with the Governor or President’s party. For 
example, M ayor  & Gov. A lignedit — 1 if the mayor of town i in year t belongs to 
the same party as the state’s Governor. I also construct a variable Gov. M arginu  
(resp. P res. M argin it, M ay. M argin#) that measures the difference between the 
share of votes earned by the incumbent governor (resp. president and mayor)
21See Alm eida and Carneiro (2009), Magalhaes (2012).
22N ote that the dataset for the dependent variable includes data from 1995 to 2010. However, 
the 2010 data are incomplete, and control variables are only available until 2008, so the sample 
used for the analysis stops in 2008. Moreover, because electoral data are not readily available 
for the 1992 mayoral election, the analysis begins in 1997, the first year for which the party of 
both the mayor and governor in each town and state is known.
23The different categories of infractions include the denial of breaks, excessive working hours, 
wage issues, denial of transport money, failure to pay contribution to workers’ pension/severance  
fund F G T S  (8%  of wage), or to register them for unemployment insurance, failure to respect 
Health and Safety norms, failure to register employment on worker card (informal em ploym ent), 
child labour, and others. The present analysis focuses on the total number of infractions.
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and his closest contestant in town i in the last election. These variables are used 
to measure the local level of electoral competition faced by politicians in each 
town. Towns where the margin of votes is small, or negative in the case o f towns 
where the governor actually lost the vote, are considered ’swing’ towns where the 
politician has little electoral support.24 Towns where the incumbent’s margin of 
votes in the previous election is large are ’core supporter’ towns. Thirdly, I match 
the names o f politicians with those o f incumbents to identify politicians in their 
second term who face a term limit. Hence the variable Gov. T erm  L im itit =  1 if 
the governor cannot run for reelection, and zero otherwise. The governors’ term 
limit is likely to be important if the manipulation o f labour sanctions is a manoeu­
vre aimed at promoting electoral support in the subsequent electoral race (rather 
than for example, a favour to a firm in exchange for a monetary compensation). 
As explained earlier, the mayors’ mandate will determine their ability to repay 
an electoral favour. These variables and their interactions with electoral timing 
allow to study how the targeting of towns for sanctioning is affected by the local 
political environment. These results are then interpreted in the light of the insti­
tutional analysis and o f theories of political economy reviewed earlier in order to 
identify the likely political channels for influence and attempt to understand the 
patronage strategies implemented.
Time invariant data on town characteristics were obtained partly from the 
2000 Population Census and partly from a national statistics office IBGE for the 
year 2007. Moreover, annual town-level population data for the 1997 to 2008 
period were also obtained. Population is the only time-variant municipality-level 
control variable to be included in all estimations. Finally, annual state-level data 
on the total number of job  contracts officially terminated were obtained from the 
Labour Ministry’s website, and are used in all estimations as a measure o f control 
for macroeconomic labour market fluctuations.
Table B .l in the Appendix reports summary statistics for all variables in­
cluded in the estimations. Note that all variables but the political characteristics 
exhibit large variation. This large variation is partly due to the capital cities, Sao 
Paulo and Belo Horizonte, which are clear outliers in the sample. Table B.2 in 
the Appendix therefore reports, for each variable, the results o f a t-test for mean 
differences between the two capital cities on the one hand and the rest of the 
sample on the other hand. The means of all variables are significantly different 
across these two subsamples, except for the political characteristics. Importantly,
24N ote that incumbent governors and president could have earned a minority of votes in some 
towns and still won the election in the state (resp. nation). Therefore, whilst m ayors’ margin 
of votes is necessarily positive, governors’ and presidents’ can also be null or negative.
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this indicates that the political environment o f these outliers is not significantly 
different from the rest of the sample. The inclusion of municipality Fixed Effects 
and control variables should therefore account for the major differences in the 
number of inspections, fines, population and economic activity, so that the polit­
ical effects identified are not biased by the presence o f these outlier towns in the 
sample. To ensure robustness o f the main estimates, results o f a regression run 
with and without outliers are reported in the Appendix.
3.5 Empirical methodology
The dependent variable in all regressions is the total annual number o f fines 
distributed at a municipal level. The empirical analysis aims to establish firstly 
whether political motivations influence the distribution o f sanctions for labour- 
infractions. One obvious way in which to trace this is by testing for the presence 
o f electoral cycles in fining. I therefore begin by testing whether the number of 
fines is significantly lower in election years, and more specifically in municipal 
or state/federal election years.25 However, political motivations can take other 
forms, which would not be apparent in the mere time series variation in fines. 
Next I therefore assess the impact of several political characteristics that vary 
across municipalities and over time within each municipality. The second set of 
regressions assesses the influence o f (i) partisan alignment between different levels 
of government, (ii) electoral competition levels, and (iii) the presence of term 
limits, on the number o f fines distributed in each town overtime. Finally, I analyse 
separately whether sanctions are used to sway voters during election years. Indeed 
the targeting of core supporter or swing voter towns specifically during election 
years may not transpire in the estimates o f the previous regressions. I therefore 
interact the political variables with dummies for election years to assess whether 
the patterns in sanctioning reflect a clientelist strategy aimed at swaying voters.
The initial regression exploits the time-series dimension o f the data, regressing 
the total number of fines on dummy variables for municipal and state election 
years, first grouped and then separately. Municipality fixed effects are used to 
control for time-invariant between-town heterogeneities. A  time trend is also 
included to control for changes in the staffing of the inspectorates:
25State and federal elections taking place on the same year, we denote them by 
State Election^  in the following equation.
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F in e s t  =  /  (7i +  T rendt +  /30 +  /3\State E lectiont 
+fd2M unic. E lectiont +  eit) (3.1)
where 7, are municipality fixed effects, Trendt is a time trend, and / ( . )  is a 
non-linear function.26 Significance of the or /32 coefficient indicates that the 
intensity with which firms are sanctioned for labour regulation infractions changes 
in election years. However, the significance of this coefficient could be due to other 
reasons than political manipulation. It is plausible that the work of bureaucrats 
is affected by the event of an election due to a change in political administration, 
possible policy readjustments or simply extra workload in election years to report 
on the inspectorate’s activity for the purpose of the political debate.
If the enforcement of regulations is influenced by political considerations, then 
the variation in the number o f fines should follow local political characteristics 
such as the partisan alignment o f mayors with state governor or president, the 
level of local electoral support and the presence of term limits. These character­
istics vary both across municipalities and overtime within municipalities, so that 
both dimensions o f the panel are exploited. I introduce the margin of victory 
variables into specification (1) as a measure o f local electoral competition. This 
aims to capture the use of selective sanctioning of labour infractions to favour 
towns based on past local electoral results. The two dummy variables for partisan 
alignment are also introduced, taking value 1 respectively if mayor and governor, 
or mayor and president in year t are from the same party in town i. I also match 
the names o f incumbent politicians with the names o f the previous incumbents’ 
and construct a dummy for “lame duck” politicians facing a term limit.2' This 
takes value 1 for incumbent governors and mayors in their second mandate:
F inesu  ~  f  (7i +  T rendt +  /30 +  /?iState E lectiont +  /32M u n ic. E lectiont
+Alignedit!3z +  M argin itfd4 +  T erm  L im itit/35 +  eit) (3.2)
where Alignedit is a vector of the alignment variables, M argin it a vector of 
the vote margin variables and T erm  L im itit a vector of term limit dummies. A 
positive significant coefficient fd3 on either o f the alignment variables indicates that
26M ore details on the estim ation method given below.
27Prior to the 2000 election, mayors were only allowed one m andate. Incumbent governors 
and politicians could first run for reelection in the 1998 election.
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either the incumbent governors or presidents who influence the issuance of fines 
favour local political allies from within their party. A significantly negative /?4 is 
evidence that the incumbent politician favours towns where she received strong 
support in the previous election. W hen the sign is positive, the indication is 
that towns where the political competition is strong are targeted. W hich o f these 
coefficients is significant also reveals which politicians’ interests are being served 
by the distribution o f sanctions, which most likely coincides with the political 
channel for influence over the bureaucracy.
Finally, I interact the political variables with election year dummies to see how 
the targeting of towns varies along the electoral cycles. Specifically, I interact the 
municipal election year dummy with the alignment o f mayor with the governor 
to test whether towns where the mayor is aligned with the governor receive fewer 
fines in years of municipal elections in order to boost their reelection chances. I 
then interact the state election year dummy with the governor’s margin o f votes to 
test for the use o f ’’ core voter” or ’’ swing voter” strategies (as defined previously). 
The third specification is:
F in es t  =  f  ( j i  +  T rendt +  /?o +  Pi State E lectiont +  P^Munic. E lectiont 
+  P^Alignedit +  P4Alignedit * M unic. E lectiona  
+  PsGov. M argiuu  +  PeGov. M argin¿t * State E lectiont +  €it) (3.3)
The dependent variable in all regressions takes on non-negative integer values. 
As can be seen in Figure B.2 o f the Appendix, the data for total fines are char­
acterised by a very large mass at zero (41% of the observations of the dependent 
variable are zeros) and a long right hand tail. The conditional mean of such a 
count variable is best described by a distribution of the Poisson family. Let the 
conditional mean of F in e s t  be a function of a vector o f the explanatory variables 
noted X , then:
E  [Finesit \X] =  f{x 'itP). (3.4)
Estimating equation (4) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), yields an un­
biased estimate o f a linear conditional mean function, when this function is non­
linear. Indeed linearity would imply the unrealistic assumption that the differ­
ence between zero and one fine being handed out in a time period is the same as 
the difference between say 500 and 501 fines. A  linear estimation model is also 
problematic as it often yields negative predicted counts. Moreover, because the 
variance of a variable that follows a Poisson distribution is proportional to its
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mean, heteroskedasticity follows practically by definition. Indeed larger values 
of the conditional mean have a larger variance and as the mean approaches zero 
the variance must also be smaller since zero is the lower bound of the distribu­
tion. Because the Poisson distribution is positively skewed, the heteroskedasticity 
is also strongly asymmetric. By not taking into account the correct functional 
form, the underlying distribution of the disturbances, nor the inherent asymmet­
ric heteroskedasticity, OLS estimates are highly inefficient as well as biased.28
The most common approach in the empirical literature using count data is 
to assume an exponential conditional mean function / ( . ) 29 and use a Poisson or 
Negative Binomial (NB) regression model to obtain unbiased and consistent es­
timates of the model parameters by Maximum Likelihood. The NB distribution 
assumes that the variance is proportional to the mean,30 V a r(y it) =  y it +  
whilst the Poisson distribution is a special case of the NB model where the mean 
o f the distribution equals its variance E {y it) — V a r(y it), i.e where a  =  0. Al­
though the two regression models are similar, Poisson estimates are known to be 
highly inefficient when the data are overdispersed (a  significantly different from 
zero), with downward-biased standard errors yielding spuriously large z-values. 
In order to assess the relative merit of these estimation methods, we first plot the 
mean and variance o f Finest in Figure B.3 where each data point corresponds 
to a different town and the red line represents the one-for-one ratio implied by 
a Poisson m odel.31 The concentration of most data points above this line is in­
dicative o f highly overdispersed data with variance strictly larger than the mean. 
Second, Figure B.4 graphs the observed variable distribution against a Poisson 
probability distribution with the same mean and a NB distribution with the same 
mean and variance. It is clear from the graph that the NB model has a far bet­
ter fit o f the actual observed dependent variable than the Poisson. Finally, the 
results of a BIC test on the Fixed Effects Poisson versus Fixed Effects Negative 
Binomial, not reported here, support the choice of the latter.
The specifications outlined above will therefore be estimated by Conditional 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation using a Negative Binomial regression model 
with Fixed Effects. Final robustness checks are then performed using OLS and
28See Cameron and Trivedi (1998).
29T h e exponential function has the advantage that it ensures non-negativity and is the only 
function that is its own derivative. See Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for more details on count 
data regression analysis.
30This is known as the N B 2 model, which is the most com m only used version of the generalized 
N B  model with mean ¡it and variance yt +  a y? . See Cameron and Trivedi (1998).
31 N ote that the sample was restricted for expositional purposes, but inclusion of the omitted  
right-hand tail of the data would make the picture even more striking.
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Zero-Inflated NB with Town and Year Fixed Effects. The results are reported 
and interpreted in the next section.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Political manipulation of labour fines
The estimation results are reported in Tables B.3 to B .6 o f the Appendix.
Table B.3 reports the results from estimating equation ( 1), which tests for 
the influence of electoral cycles on the distribution of fines. Beginning with a 
simple dummy for election years, I then separate municipal election years (2000, 
2004 and 2008 in the period of study) from years of federal and state elections 
(1998, 2002, 2006). The results suggest that there is no significant difference in 
the number of fines distributed between election years and non-election years, 
independently of the type of election. This result is robust to Negative Binomial 
(NB) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations with Fixed Effects and 
standard errors clustered at the municipality level to control for serial correlation 
in the error term .32 The absence of electoral cycles in labour fines suggests that 
any manipulation o f enforcement does not happen specifically during election 
times when it is most likely to sway voters’ behaviour. Nonetheless, this may 
hide some manipulation during election years in particular towns and not others 
based on other political characteristics. We address this possibility in Table B.5.
The estimations so far have only exploited the time series variation in the data. 
If the allocation of fines is influenced by political considerations, then we should 
expect to find significant differences across towns depending on political factors 
such as the partisan alignment of the town mayor with governor and/or president, 
the level of political competition they face in each town and the presence of term 
limits.
Table B.4 addresses such issues. To begin with, F in esit is regressed on the 
three vote margin variables described above to determine whether labour sanc­
tions are used to promote politicians’ interests according to the level of electoral 
support they received locally in the last election. Given the institutional analysis, 
a significant coefficient might be expected for the mayor’s margin if we believe 
inspectors are subject to local capture despite the reforms aimed at boosting their
32Colum n (2) is the result of a regression using N B  using Random  Effects rather than Fixed 
Effects. This is because a N B  model needs a lot of information to be estimated, and a Fixed 
Effects m odels throws a lot of information away (all comparisons between individuals), so that 
this specification does not converge.
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independence from local powers. Alternatively we expect the governor’s margin 
to be significant as the most likely channel for political influence is at the regional 
director’s level.
The results in Columns ( 1) and (3) suggest that mayors’ and the president’s 
local electoral support in the previous election has no bearing on the distribution 
of fines. The coefficient on the governors’ margin of votes in Column (2) is 
negative and strongly significant however, indicating that towns where there is a 
strong concentration of the governor’s supporters receive fewer fines than other 
towns. The magnitude o f the coefficient suggests that a one standard deviation 
increase in the margin of votes won by the governor in the average municipality 
is associated with a 7.5 per cent reduction in the number o f fines.33 This suggests 
that governors can marginally influence the allocation of labour sanctions across 
towns in their state to favour towns with a large presence of their supporters.
Next, I introduce the dummy variables for the mayors’ partisan alignment to 
test whether towns with mayors from the same party as the governor or president 
receive fewer fines than others. The results in Column (4) show that whilst the 
mayors’ alignment with the president’s party has no impact on the number o f fines 
distributed in a municipality, alignment with the governor’s party is associated 
with a small but significant reduction in fining. The negative coefficient on the 
alignment variable, significant at a 5% level, suggests that towns where the mayor 
is aligned with the governor’s party receive on average 4.7% fewer fines than 
towns where the mayor is not aligned, keeping all else equal. This result, while in 
line with the intra-governmental partisan distributive patterns identified in the 
empirical literature on intergovernmental transfers and political intervention in 
environmental regulation in Brazil,34 is very small in magnitude and as reported 
in Table B .6 , it is also not robust to other estimation methods.
Finally, I look at the impact o f a binding term limit on the pattern of sanctions 
by introducing a dummy variable taking value one when the governor (resp. 
mayor) is in his second mandate and cannot run for reelection. The coefficients 
in Column (5) reveal that when the governor faces a binding term limit the 
total number of fines is 17.2 per cent higher on average in his state. This large 
coefficient probably reflects the efficiency gains from the fact that a second term 
governor is less likely to make disruptive changes in the regional inspectorate 
offices such as selecting a new director. However, the event of a mayor facing a 
term limit has no significant consequences for the issuance o f fines in his town. In
33The standard deviation of the governor’s margin of victory is 28.23 implying an average 
reduction of 0 .0 0 2 6 8 *2 8 .2 3 = 7 .5 6 % , where 0.00268 is the marginal effect for the average town.
34See for instance Ferreira and Burgarin (2005); Camacho and Conover (2009); Ferraz (2007).
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Columns (6) and (7) I then interact these dummy variables with the significant 
partisan alignment and vote margin variables. The results in Column (6) indicate 
that the mayor’s ability to run for reelection is of no consequence to the favourable 
treatment received from the governor. This suggests that the governor’s support 
for an aligned mayor is not conditional on the mayor being able to repay the 
favour in his next election, which is contradictory with previous empirical studies 
in Brazil and with the basic assumptions of the theoretical literature. Finally, 
the results in Column (7) suggest that the targeting o f “core supporter” towns by 
the governor is not significantly different in the governors’ two mandates. If this 
targeting o f “core voter” towns were aimed at capturing votes however, then one 
would expect that the rise in the number of fines in the governor’s second term 
should be concentrated in those towns where sanctioning was previously reduced.
In order to test whether this targeting of towns is unrelated to an electoral 
strategy, I next interact the governor’s margin of votes and partisan alignment 
with dummies for election years.
3.6.2 An electoral strategy?
Although the results o f the first series of estimations suggest that on average 
there are no electoral cycles in sanctioning, it is plausible that certain towns are 
targeted during election years based on their political characteristics and not oth­
ers. For instance, if towns where the governor faces high political competition are 
targeted during state election years, characterising a ’’ swing voter” strategy, this 
might not be reflected in the average effect of the state election year dummy on 
the distribution of fines across all towns. Following the literature, I therefore in­
vestigate whether the targeting of sanctions across towns changes during election 
years depending on their political characteristics. If manipulation of sanctions 
aims to promote the governors’ (or partisan mayors’ ) electoral success, one should 
expect to find that the targeting of towns would be particularly relevant in state 
(respectively municipal) election years. To test this, I interact the relevant po­
litical variables with the corresponding dummies for the timing o f elections. The 
results are reported in Table B.5. As shown in Column ( 1), while the coefficient 
on the mayors’ partisan alignment with the governor is negative and significant 
as in the previous estimation, the interactions with the municipal election year 
dummy is insignificant. Similarly for the governors’ votes margin in Column (2), 
its coefficient is negative and significant, but the coefficient on its interaction with 
the state election year dummy is not. Hence sanctioning is marginally reduced 
in towns when a large share of the supporters turned out to support the incum­
60
bent governors at the last election, but this favouritism is not part of an electoral 
strategy to sway voters during election years.
3.6.3 Robustness checks
The analysis o f the data in Section 4 concluded that given the distribution of the 
observations on the dependent variable, the most appropriate estimation method 
is to estimate the specifications using the FENB model by Conditional Maxi­
mum Likelihood. In this section, the robustness of the results to other estimation 
methods and to the exclusion of the state capitals from the sample is tested, 
and reported in Table B .6 of the Appendix. In particular, the coefficients on 
the key three variables that had significant coefficients are re-estimated by OLS 
with Town FE and Year FE, and by Zero-Inflated NB (ZINB) with Year FE, 
in both cases clustering standard errors at the town level to control for serial 
correlation in the error terms. The inclusion of these two dimensions of FE al­
lows to control further for the possibility of time-variant confounders as well as 
time invariant town-level unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, the ZINB model 
takes into account the “excess zeros” in the distribution o f F in es t , by assuming 
that these zeros can come from two different processes. A  first Logit equation is 
estimated, regressing F in esit on the town controls to estimate the role of town 
characteristics in the sample of towns where zero fines were distributed through­
out the period. The second equation addresses the other towns that are not “sure 
zeros” , to estimate by NB the impact of town controls and political factors 011 
the number of fines distributed annually (as previously). The results, reported 
in Table B .6 of the Appendix, mostly confirm the conclusions of the previous 
sections. Whilst the governor’s margin of votes is consistently significant across 
estimation methods, the partisan alignment of the mayor is not robust to most 
estimation methods. Finally the effect of a binding term limit for the governor 
has a robustly positive impact on the number of fines.
3.7 Conclusion
Chapter 3 takes a political economy perspective on the space between institu­
tions and implementation in the context of labour regulation enforcement in 
Brazil. The empirical investigation tests firstly for electoral cycles in the imposi­
tion o f labour fines, secondly whether labour regulations are selectively enforced 
according to political motivations and finally, it assesses whether “pork barrel” 
strategies are used in order to sway voters. Electoral results are matched with a
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novel dataset o f fines imposed on firms for labour infractions to test these con­
siderations. Firstly, the analysis finds that mayors’ and the president’s political 
interests are not significantly correlated with the distribution of fines, neither is 
the alignment of local politicians with governors or the president. Secondly, the 
appointment of a new governor is a highly disruptive event for the inspectorate, 
as evidenced by the steep rise in the number of fines issues in governors’ sec­
ond term. Thirdly, towns where the governor received strong support in the last 
election have marginally fewer fines on average. These results corroborate the 
evidence from the institutional analysis of the inspectorate, namely that a key 
channel for political influence on regulatory enforcement is through the Regional 
Inspectorate superintendents who are appointed by the state governors. However 
fourthly, in contrast with Ferraz (2007)’s findings in the context o f environmental 
regulations in Brazil, the pattern of targeting does not vary significantly along 
the electoral cycle making it unlikely to be an electoral clientelism strategy. The 
results are interpreted as indicating that labour sanctions are not amenable to 
significant manipulation by politicians, particularly not for swaying voters. The 
significant reforms in the organisation of labour inspectorates in Brazil since the 
mid-1990s to guarantee more autonomy to the inspectors are likely to be partly 
responsible for this. Another plausible explanation is the availability of other, 
more efficient and more effective means to sway voters. In fact, fiscal transfers 
have received far more attention in the political economy literature precisely for 
this reason.
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A P P E N D IX  B
B .l Data description
Figure B .l: Election timing
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Table B .l: Summary statistics
V a r ia b le M e a n S t d . D e v . M i n . M a x . M e d i a n
Town characteristics 
P opulation 3 7 ,8 0 2 .4 0 6 2 8 7 ,3 8 6 .9 0 9 774 11 ,016 ,70 3 8 ,8 19
Inspections
Office 0 .028 0 .1 65 0 1 0
R egional Office 0 .0 17 0 .1 28 0 1 0
Inspectors 12 .457 6 .9 12 4 121 12
Regional Inspectors 8 .8 4 26 .606 1 121 1
T ota l Fines 31 .46 279 .68 5 0 13761 2
Fine: Breaks 3 .496 36 .365 0 1468 0
Fine: F G T S 4.871 4 3 .459 0 1864 0
Fine: W ork in g  Hours 2 .85 28 .976 0 1483 0
Fine: H ealth  Safety  (N R ) 7 .17 65 .236 0 4546 0
Fine: O th er 5 .714 61 .115 0 2917 0
Fine: R A IS 0.052 0 .8 37 0 52 0
Fine: W orker R egistration 4.021 29 .521 0 1132 0
Fine: W a g e 2 .877 24 .728 0 991 0
Fine: H ealth  &  Safety 0.21 0 .851 0 24 0
Fine: Seguro D esem prego 0 .006 0 .1 18 0 9 0
Fine: C hild  Labour 0 .059 1.092 0 107 0
Fine: Transport 0 .134 2.302 0 124 0
Political characteristics
General E lection 0.25 0 .4 33 0 1 0
M unicipal E lection 0.25 0 .4 33 0 1 0
Electorate 24 ,7 9 9 .5 6 198 ,946 .6 698 7 ,9 5 3 ,1 4 4 6 ,3 77
G ov . M argin 24 .845 28 .145 -7 5 .3 9 3 9 2 .353 24 .26
M ay. M argin 18.175 19.316 0 100 12.266
Pres. M argin 26 .776 2 8 .167 -7 3 .7 0 8 89 .22 29 .938
M ayor &  G ov . A ligned 0 .253 0 .4 34 0 1 0
G ov . &  Pres. A ligned 0.31 0 .4 63 0 1 0
M ayor &  Pres. A ligned 0.171 0 .3 76 0 1 0
M ayor, G ov . &  Pres. A ligned 0 .092 0.29 0 1 0
M ayor Term  Lim it 0 .182 0.386 0 1 0
G overnor Term  L im it 0 .238 0 .4 26 0 1 0
President Term  Lim it 0 .5 0 .5 0 1 0 .5
Notes: The data on town characteristics apart from the population data refer to the year 2000 or 2007 
only and were obtained from the web pages of the national statistical offices IBGE and IPEA. The data 
on inspections were obtained directly from the Brazilian Ministry of Labour (M TE), and the electoial 
data from the Electoral Tribunal (TSE). See main text for further data description.
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Table B.2: T-test on mean difference between capitals and other towns
Town characteristics
Town Population -6369811.7*** (-184.75)
Town GDP per capita (R s’0000) ***COT—1
1—
11 (-4.38)
Town GVA Agriculture (R s’0000) 0.921 (1.48)
Town GVA Industry (R s’0000) -3206.8*** (-135.55)
Town GVA Services (R s’0000) -11739.9*** (-162.74)
Town GVA Industry (Rs’0000) -1125.2*** (-181.01)
Taxes (R s’0000) -2911.9*** (-152.17)
Total Employment (2000) -1803346.2*** (-185.55)
Informality Rate 0.167*** (5.58)
Inspections
Office -0.973*** (-29.56)
Regional Office -0.985*** (-39.20)
Inspectors -106.2*** (-90.86)
Regional Inspectors -94.20*** (-60.91)
Total Fines -6844.1*** (-266.86)
Fine: Breaks -904.1*** (-290.27)
Fine: FGTS -1036.1*** (-237.24)
Fine: Working Hours -689.2*** (-234.93)
Fine: Health & Safety (NR) -1305.7*** (-143.56)
Fine: Other -1511.5*** (-281.98)
Fine: RAIS -12.17*** (-84.03)
Fine: Worker Registration -715.1*** (-254.14)
Fine: Wage -604.5*** (-265.56)
Fine: Health & Safety -5.255*** (-31.01)
Fine: Seguro Desemprego -0.829*** (-35.48)
Fine: Child Labour -7.868*** (-36.58)
Fine: Transport -51.81*** (-193.44)
Political characteristics
Electorate -4575532.3*** (-94.94)
Gov. Margin 5.575 (0.97)
May. Margin -8.488* (-2.15)
Pres. Margin 2.011 (0.35)
Mayor & Gov. Aligned 0.0860 (0.97)
Gov. & Pres. Aligned -0.0232 (-0.25)
Mayor & Pres. Aligned -0.0793 (-1.03)
Mayor, Gov. & Pres. Aligned 0.0925 (1.56)
Mayor Term Limit 0.0158 (0.20)
Governor Term Limit -0.0116 (-0.13)
Observations 17976
Standard errors in parentheses. * p <  0.1, ** p <  0 .05, *** p <  0.01
Notes: The data on town characteristics apart from the population data  
refer to the year 2000 or 2007 only and were obtained from the web 
pages of the national statistical offices IB G E  and IP E A . th e  data on 
inspections were obtained directly from the Brazilian Ministry ol Labour 
(M T E ), and the electoral data from the Electoral Tribunal (T S E ). See 
main text for further data description.




Source: The annual data on total number of fines distributed at a town level from 
1997 to 2008 were obtained directly from the Brazilian M inistry of Labour (M T E ). 
The sample is truncated at 1,000 for expositional purposes
Figure B.3: Dependent variable mean-variance relationship
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Source: The annual data on total number of fines distributed at a town level from 
1997 to 2008 were obtained directly from the Brazilian Ministry of Labour (M T E ). 
Outliers are excluded for expositional purposes.
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Figure B.4: Dependent variable distribution on Poisson, Negative Binomial and 
Observed
k
mean = 31.46; overdispersion = 6.599
  observed proportion — 0 —  neg binom prob
•a  poisson prob
Source: The annual data, on total number of fines distributed at a town level from 1997 to 
2008 were obtained directly from the Brazilian Ministry of Labour (M T E ).
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B.2 Empirical results
Table B.3: Labour fines and electoral cycles
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
T o ta l F ines NB NB OLS OLS
Election Year -0.002 0.511
(0.016) (0.437)
Municipal Election -0.498 -0.509
(1.546) (0.522)
General Election 0.224 1.439
(1.497) (0.930)
Constant -0.618 11.10 160.0 159.7
(0.0298)*** (4.129)*** (38.87)*** (38.71)***
Observations 16428 17976 17976 17976
Log Likelihood -39038.8 -97009.6 -97008.1
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Town Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. * p <  0 .1 , ** p <  0 .05, *** p <  0.01
Notes: Controls include town population and a state-level measure of job  contract 
terminations. These data were obtained from the web pages of the national statis­
tical offices IB G E  and IP E A . The data on inspections were obtained directly from 
the Brazilian Ministry of Labour (M T E ), and the electoral data from the Electoral 
Tribunal (T S E ). See main text for further data description. Note that Column (2) 


































































































































Standard errors in parentheses. * p <  0.1, ** p <  0.05, *** p <  0.01
Notes: Controls include annual town population and a state-level measure of job contract 
terminations. These data were obtained from the web pages of the national statistical offices 
IB G E  and IP E A . The data on inspections were obtained directly from the Brazilian Ministry 
of Labour (M T E ) , and the electoral data from the Electoral Tribunal (T S E ). See main text 
for further data description.
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M unicipal Election -0 .0 2 4 4
(0 .01 98)




-0 .0 3 8 1
(0 .02 20)*
-0 .2 0 0
(0 .0657)***




-0 .3 0 8
(0 .955)
-0 .0 2 6 1
(0 .02 28)
0 .0 0 9 9 0
(0 .0 4 2 4 )
G ov . M argin -0 .0 0 1 2 1
(0 .000410)***
-0 .1 0 3
(0 .0426)**
-0 .1 2 7
(0.0453)***
-0 .0 0 1 6 9
(0 .0 0 1 2 8 )
-0 .0 0 3 1 4
(0 .00128)**
M a y -G o v  Aligned -0 .0 1 7 3
(0 .02 20)
-0 .6 5 5
(1 .372)
-0 .4 5 7
(1 .343)
-0 .1 0 4
(0 .0484)**
-0 .0 9 4 8
(0 .0482)**






























O bservations  
L og  Likelihood  
C ap ita ls Included  
T im e  trend  
T im e  Fixed Effects  
Tow n Fixed Effects 
Controls
16254


































Standard errors in parentheses. * p <  0.1, ** p <  0.05, *** p <  0.01
Notes: Controls include annual town population and a state-level measure of job contract terminations. 
These data were obtained from the web pages of the national statistical offices IBGE and IPEA. The data 
on inspections were obtained directly from the Brazilian Ministry of Labour (M TE), and the electoral 
data from the Electoral Tribunal (TSE). See main text for further data description.
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C H A P T E R  4
Taxation and Informality in a 
Dual Sector Probabilistic Voting Model
Abstract
U p  to  7 0 %  o f u rban  workers in developing countries are em p loyed  in 
th e sh ad ow  econom y, w hich is largely characterised b y  high  poverty  and  
u n d erem p lo ym en t rates. Y e t  these countries also ten d  to  have low  redis­
trib u tiv e  ta x a tio n . T h is  chapter builds the first probab ilistic  votin g  m od el  
w ith  en d ogen ous sector a llocation  in a dual sector econom y. It is used to  
explore th e  interaction  betw een  relative returns to  form al sector p ro d u c­
tio n , d eterm in ed  b y  labour pro d u ctiv ity  and the q u ality  o f  in stitu tio n s, 
a n d  th e  d e m a n d  for a redistribu tive public g oo d  in a m a jorita ria n  sy stem . 
T h e  m o d e l pred icts th a t low  ta x  rates are an o p tim a l response b y  voters to  
low  p ro d u c tiv ity  prem ia  from  form al activity. P red icted  in form ality  share 
decreases a nd  ta x a tio n  increases as the relative p ro d u ctiv ity  o f form al em ­
p lo y m en t rises. M oreover, im provem ents in in stitu tion al q u ality  generate  
greater increases in redistribution  and reductions in in form ality  in cou n­
tries w ith  lower p rod u ctiv ity .
K eyw ord s: In form al Sector, P u b lic  Policy, P rob abilistic  V o tin g ;
JEL codes: D 7 2 , 0 1 7 .
4.1 Introduction
Informality is widespread, particularly in the developing world where it is charac­
terised by low quality jobs and high poverty rates. Schneider et al. (2010) find a 
38.7% average share of GDP produced in the shadow economy across 98 develop­
ing countries in 2007 up from 36.6 in 1999, whilst the World Bank estimates that 
in 2007, 54 percent of total urban employment in Latin America and Caribbean 
was informal.1 In the same report, the World Bank finds that poverty and in­
formality are positively correlated in a sample of 43 developing countries. Yet 
cross country studies reveal that democratic governments tend to be smaller and 
taxation rates lower in countries with larger informal sectors.2 Such stylised facts 
contradict the established notion that a higher tax burden on the formal sector 
drives economic activity underground, which emerges from dual sector models 
with exogenous policy, and challenges the intuition from voting models that a 
greater share of the poor in the electorate should lead to more redistribution.
This chapter provides the first theoretical framework integrating a probabilis­
tic voting model in a dual economy setting where agents endogenously choose 
their sector of activity. Endogenising both economic and political mechanisms 
enables the model to explain the negative correlation between taxation and infor­
mality rates found in cross-country data. This relation is attributed to differences 
in institutional quality.
The model makes use of few and standard assumptions to derive this result. 
All agents consume the public good, which is financed by an endogenous tax 
on formal sector workers. The returns to working formally are increasing in an 
agent’s ability, so expected pre-tax income in the formal sector is proportional 
to ability, where as in the unofficial economy income is fixed, as is commonly 
assumed in dual sector models. When returns to informality are relatively high, 
or equivalently when a large share of agents have a low expected premium from 
formalisation, more agents choose unofficial work and vote to maximise the level 
o f public good. On the contrary, when more agents are better off working for­
mally, the incentive to reduce the tax burden on the formal sector is greater. Yet, 
in the equilibrium of the model higher taxes are chosen the larger the share of 
agents who have positive premia from formalisation. This is due to a type of 
Laffer curve effect caused by the existence of an informal sector: The elasticity of
1See Fajnzylber et al. (2007)
2Regarding the link with taxation, Aruoba. (2010) find that tax rates and the size ol the 
informal sector are significantly negatively correlated (coefficient o f - 0 . 4 / )  in a sample ol 33 
countries, whilst Hatipoglu and Ozbek (2011) find a significant negative correlation between 
redistribution and informal sector size, also using cross country data.
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formalisation to taxation falls with the share of agents who can benefit from for­
mality. In other words, as institutional quality improves and the relative benefits 
o f formality become more widespread a smaller proportion o f potential contribu­
tors to the public good choose to relocate to the informal sector for a given tax 
rise. On the political side, voters who know their own ability and the distribution 
o f abilities in the population vote for the politician whose policy platform grants 
them highest expected utility from private and public good consumption. The 
probabilistic model is used to aggregate preferences and no distortions to the po­
litical process are introduced in order to focus on the economic factors underlying 
the relation between taxation and informality in a majoritarian democracy. In 
equilibrium, the tax rate that maximises politicians’ probability of being elected 
equates marginal benefit from aggregate public good consumption with marginal 
cost of taxation borne by the formal sector. As a result, the tax rate is increasing 
and informality rate is decreasing in the relative productivity of official activity. 
The negative relation between taxation and informality found in cross country 
studies results from an optimal choice by social welfare maximising politicians in 
countries that differ in their institutional quality. Finally, comparative statics on 
the distribution of ability show that improvements in institutional quality lead to 
greater increases in redistribution for a given informality share in countries with 
a lower distribution of productivity in the workforce, in the sense of first order 
stochastic dominance.
This chapter relates to the budding literature that models a dual economy 
with endogenous choice of sector to study the interaction between policy and 
sector size. The closest related article, which also endogenises both policy and 
sector choice is Hatipoglu and Ozbek (2011), in which the authors use a com­
putable general equilibrium model to make similar predictions to this chapter’s. 
Endogenising the decision of how much to redistribute as a median voter prob­
lem and embedding it within a labor-leisure choice framework, they find that 
an increase in the relative returns to unofficial activity leads to a decrease in 
redistribution and an increase in the informal sector size. Although their model 
relies on a more sophisticated labor market mechanism, more assumptions are 
required to generate results which corroborate the stylised facts outlined above. 
Moreover, they model the choice of tax rate as a function of the sector choice 
of the median voter, which compels them to vary the political weights of rich 
and poor or the distribution of skills in order to generate several discrete and 
non-comparable equilibria in which the median voter is employed in a different
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sector. As a result, they must make an educated guess of the median voter’s 
identity when calibrating their model with cross-country data. In contrast, this 
chapter provides a continuous prediction of the equilibrium policy through the 
use o f a probabilistic voting model which completely endogenises the interplay 
between tax rate and sector sizes, generating a sort of Laffer curve as described 
above.
The rest o f the literature which uses models with exogenous policy choice relies 
on the assumption that the public good gives rise to a productivity premium in the 
formal sector in order to generate strategic complementarities from formalisation 
which cause the negative link between taxation and informality in equilibrium. 
Ihrig and M oe (2004) study the evolution of informal sector size toward a steady 
state in a dynamic investment model, using the Johnson et al. (1997) framework 
which considers such a productivity enhancing public good. Similarly, Dessy and 
Pallage (2003) model the allocation of firms to the formal and informal sectors 
in a two-period heterogenous-agents model where a tax levied on formal sector 
firms finances a public good that is accessible only to the formal sector where it 
generates a productivity premium. However, in assuming that the policy choice is 
exogenous, these models cannot explain the choice of low redistributive taxation 
in democratic countries with high informality rates.
Finally, inequality is also a key factor in determining the size of the infor­
mal sector. Chong and Gradstein (2007) study the marginal effect of income 
inequality on the level of informality. Their model also features a premium from 
formalisation that depends on institutional quality, reflected by the degree of legal 
enforcement and property rights protection. They test their theoretical predic­
tions, finding empirical support for the fact that a rise in income inequality leads 
to an increase in informality by lowering relative benefits from formality for the 
poor, particularly as institutions become weaker.3 Mishra and Ray (2011) find 
corroborative evidence using a large firm-level dataset. They also provide a more 
in-depth explanation of two channels through which inequality in wealth/income 
fosters informality. In the presence of barriers to entry into formality and imper­
fect credit markets, a greater share of wealth constrained entrepreneurs cannot 
afford to join the formal sector and produce informally. Alternatively, profitabil­
ity in the informal sector might be high if barriers to entry prevent efficient wealth 
constrained entrepreneurs to produce formally, leading the competing formal sec­
tor to be relatively inefficient. Income inequality is not central to this chapter
3A  rise in Gini from Mexican (0.49) to Brazilian (0.57) levels correlates with a 3 to 9 
percentage point increase in informality.
75
so it does not featuie explicitly in the model. However, the share o f agents of 
the population who cannot profitably produce in the formal sector, which can be 
taken as a reflection of higher inequality, drives informality rates up and taxation 
down in the present model.
The main contribution of chapter 4 is its theoretical framework: It is the 
fust probabilistic voting model in a dual economy setting with endogenous sector 
choice, allowing a parsimonious study of the relation between informality rate 
and policy choice. The model explains the difference in returns to informality be­
tween countries by the interaction between institutional quality and productivity 
distribution in line with a large body of research, which is reviewed below.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the model 
and justifies its assumptions, Section 3 derives the equilibrium policy and sector 




Consider an economy with two sectors J — {F ; / } ,  respectively a formal and an 
informal sector. A population of mass 1 of risk-neutral agents are characterised by 
an idiosyncratic ability level ct; that follows a uniform distribution on [a, a  +  1] 
where a  >  0.4 Agents can work in the official economy where firms have access 
to more productive technologies and management techniques and can accumulate 
physical capital more easily so that workers’ ability matters. Therefore formal 
sector workers are assumed to earn their marginal product ai and pay income 
tax at rate r:
y f  =  ( l - T ) a i  (4.1)
Alternatively, they can join the informal sector5. Following Schneider et al. 
(2010), informality is defined as the illegal production of legal goods and services 
that would normally enter gross national product calculations, hence excluding 
the household economy and criminal activities. This form of informal employ­
4Countries with higher levels of human capital or better technology allowing for more efficient 
formal sector production have higher a, so that their productivity distribution dominates less 
developed countries’ distribution in the sense of first order stochastic dominance.
5N ote that in this model, agents’ choice is stripped to the simplest decision to join either the 
formal or the informal sector. Agents do not have the choice of not working, nor is a distinction 
made between joining wage employment or entrepreneurship.
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ment is largely associated with poverty and underemployment6 to the extent that 
workers o f larger more productive firms that hide part of their activity from the 
authorities for the purposes of tax evasion are not counted as informal agents.' 
Informal firms tend to operate on a small scale, using labor-intensive technology, 
generating low revenues that do not allow for capital accumulation. Production 
thus tends to be inefficient both because firms have to remain small to not at­
tract the government’s attention, and because they lack access to efficient credit 
markets8 and to modern production technology. Therefore, agents are assumed 
to receive low fixed income p £ [a, 1 +  a] if they choose the informal sector:
y{ =  y  (4.2)
R e m a rk  4 .1  If p  >  a, some agents have a negative productivity premium, from  
formalising irrespective o f the tax rate and will always choose to produce infor­
mally. When p  =  a  full formalisation is possible and occurs if t =  0.
On the one hand, it is assumed that informal sectors exist in countries with 
very high quality institutions {¡jl =  a) but only due to the taxation cost imposed 
on formal producers. Countries with poor quality institutions (p  >  a ) on the 
other hand have a ’structural’ informal sector, a positive share of their workforce 
that cannot profitably join the formal sector irrespective of the taxation rate. In 
general, the difference (cti —p) can be thought of as the productivity premium that 
an agent i can earn by joining the formal sector rather than producing informally. 
As discussed in the introduction, it is sometimes assumed in the literature that 
the size o f this productivity premium depends on the public good in order to 
generate strategic complementarities between the share of agents who produce 
formally and the productivity premium they enjoy in the formal sector. Here this 
assumption is not required. Instead the size of this productivity premium depends 
both on the distribution of abilities and on the quality of institutions, such as the 
degree o f contract enforcement and property rights protection,9 captured in the 
model by the parameter p.
6See Gerxhani (2004).
7T his distinction with pure tax evasion is important as the fiscal preferences of voters in the 
informal sector is understood to coincide with that of low income agents.
8See Straub (2005), Mishra and Ray (2011).
9See Dessy and Pallage (2003); Chong and Gradstein (2007) for example.
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4.2.2 Choice of sector
Empirical evidence shows that people engage in shadow economic activity for a 
variety of reasons. Schneider et al. (2010) identify the burden of direct and indi­
rect taxation, high labour market regulations and the state of the official economy 
as drivers of informality. Broadly speaking, workers are either excluded from for­
mal employment due to high barriers to entry, including the tax burden, or choose 
to exit formality because of its low benefits relative to informal activity.10 The 
key parameter in the choice of sector is therefore the net relative returns from 
formal versus informal activity. This is in the simplest way what determines the 
allocation o f workers across sectors in this model: Agents sort into the sectors by 
comparing their net expected returns from working in each for a given tax rate.11
P r o p o s it io n  4.1 For a given tax rate and returns to informality p , there exists 
a threshold productivity level a (r , p) such that all agents with ability a.i >  d (r , p) 
produce formally and all agents with ability ai <  a (r , p) enter the informal sector. 
This threshold is increasing in p and in t .
P r o o f . For a given distribution of abilities, there is an agent with ability a (r )  
who is indifferent between the two sectors:
y f  ( « )  =  v\ (<*)
a (r , p) =  ^¡TT7 )
For a given institutional quality p, all agents with ability a¿ >  d (r )  receive 
higher after-tax returns by producing formally so enter the tax-paying formal 
sector, and all agents with ability <  d (r ) enter the informal sector. The 
derivatives o f (4 .3) with respect to p  and r  are positive, indicating that this 
threshold is increasing both in p  and in r.
■
From Proposition 4.1 we can see that an informal sector exists if <5(t, p) >  a, 
that is r  >  1 -  M.12 Moreover, from Remark 4.1 we know that for p >  a  anda
10See the excellent Fajnzylber et al. (2007) report on the informal sector.
n Loayza (1997) makes a similar assumption, with the difference that informal sector firms 
enjoy public services which they do not contribute to, leading to costly congestion of public 
goods. In this model, informal sector agents also enjoy the public good but it is non-rival so
does not suffer from congestion.
12It can be shown that this will always be the case in equilibrium. See Proposition 4.3.
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t  >  0 the informal sector is heterogeneous, including an “upper-tier” of relatively 
m oie skilled agents who have ability /i <  a, <  a  but work informally due to the 
tax buiden and a structural informal sector" composed of unskilled free-entry 
jobs for agents with ability ctj <  ¡1 ,13 This is shown in Figure 4.1 below. The 
size of the formal sector is J^+1 di =  1 +  a  -  a, and / “  di =  a  -  a  is the share 
o f agents working informally.
Figure 4.1: Sectoral distribution of agents
Income
INFORMAL FORMAL
Proposition 4.1 also argues that higher relative returns to informality ji and 
higher taxation rates r  encourage producers into the informal sector, consistent 
with the literature, which identifies various determinants o f the former. In a 
cross country study, Djankov et al. (2002) find that barriers to entry, including 
the number of procedures, official time and cost of starting a firm in the formal 
sector are very high in most of the 85 countries sampled and significantly cor­
related with larger informal economies. Regulations cause substantial increases 
in formal sector labour costs, which can be shifted onto the employees. This 
reinforces workers’ incentives to join the informal sector. Friedman et al. (2000); 
Johnson et al. (1998, 1999) also identify enforcement of regulation as a key factor 
in determining its impact on the allocation of resources towards informality. En­
forcement o f labour regulations constrains firm size by raising labour costs causing 
firms to employ less labour and produce on a smaller scale, and by raising the 
probability o f detection of informal firms, which is increasing in firm size.14 This
13See Fields (2005) for an inventory of dual economy models and informality types.
14Using data from Brazil, Alm eida and Carneiro (2009) find that a 1%  increase in enforcement 
leads to a 0 .4 7 %  reduction in average employment per firm, 0 .48%  decline in output and 0.46%
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evidence is robustly found in other studies. Using an integrated micro-economic 
dataset on firms from many developing countries Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) com­
pare the relative significance o f informality causes. They identify legal quality 
as the single most significant factor that affects the size of the informal sector 
by acting on informal entrepreneurs’ probability of detection. Just as the infor­
mal sector is heterogeneous, so too are the impact of these factors. Dabla-Norris 
et al. (2008) show that finance constraints are more likely to lead small firms into 
the shadow economy, where as large firms are put off formality by legal obsta­
cles. The impact of credit market efficiency is also investigated by Straub (2005) 
who looks into the role of credit market institutions in the allocation of firms 
across sectors when information asymmetries related to credit can be overcome 
by formal sector but not informal sector firms. He shows that when access to 
the formal sector is costly, the endogenous allocation of firms across sectors de­
pends on their initial level of capital, the cost of entry to formality and relative 
efficiency of credit markets, which depends on various institutional parameters. 
Countries with better institutions have more efficient formal credit markets and 
smaller informal sectors as a consequence. To keep matters simple, none of these 
parameters feature explicitly in the present model, but their effect on the results 
can easily be related to the parameters of the model. For example, the tax rate 
in the model can also reflect labour costs caused by other taxes or regulations 
that are passed on to the employees, in as much as these contribute to funding 
the public good that is redistributive through its universal consumption.
The size and composition of the informal sector depend on the relative magni­
tude of the tax rate and quality of institutions for a given distribution of abilities. 
This relative magnitude is determined by the choice of policy in the political equi­
librium. Next we turn to the political building block of the model.
4.2.3 Policy preferences and voting
Agents’ preferences are quasi-linear. An agent i gets utility from private con­
sumption and from a public good g:
Wi =  Ci +  H(g)  (4.4)
where Cj =  m ax  {/r, (1 — '!~)Q!i} and preferences over the public good are as­
sumed to be concave, g is a redistributive public good financed by the diiect tax 





I A  ( 1  +  ° )  —  <S2 ( r )g =  r a tda =  r   K—L. (4 5 )
J  a ^
Voters choose equilibrium policies (here r  and g ) through an election in 
which two candidates compete by offering a policy platform. Voting behaviour is 
modelled using a probabilistic voting model (see Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)). 
Agents’ choice of candidate is determined by their preferences over the policies 
proposed by both candidates and by ideology (orthogonal to the policy dimen­
sion). Agent i votes for candidate A if:
W / (t a , gA) >  W f  (tb , gB) +  n +  6 (4.6)
where q is an idiosyncratic ideological bias towards candidate B that follows 
a uniform distribution with density 0 on — ^  . Note that this parameter
determines the political weight of a group of agents in a probabilistic voting- 
model, as it defines how responsive voters in this group are to a shift in policy 
platform towards their bliss point. In this chapter, this parameter is distributed
uniformly over the whole population, in order to focus purely on the welfare
maximising taxation choice under different levels of institutional quality. An 
interesting extension involves allowing this parameter to vary across formal and 
informal sector, modelling explicitly the factors that determine its relative density 
in each sector, in order to study other political economy effects of informality. 
Finally, <5 is an aggregate relative popularity shock that affects all voters in the 
same way and is distributed uniformly on ^  with density ip.
The timing is:
1. Political platforms are announced: [ta , gA] and [t b , g 3 }. At this time the 
candidates know the distributions for and 5.
2. Actual value of 5 is realised and all uncertainty is resolved.
3. Election occurs.
4. The winner implements her platform.
To determine the platforms chosen by the candidates at stage 1, let us identify 
the swing voter in each sector, that is the agent i with an ideological bias ¿j that 
makes her just indifferent between the two candidates, given her choice of sectoi 
and the proposed policies:
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iJ =  W ? { ta , gA; Qi) -  W / ( r B, gB; a,) -  5
tJ =m a x {¡i + H(gA), (1 -  TA)ai + H(gA)}
-  max {n  + H(gB), (1 -  rB)a8 + H(g3 )} -  5
As we have seen in the previous section, sector shares are given by the 
threshold ability a (r ) ,  which is itself a function of the equilibrium policy choice, 
with all agents i with ability a* <  a(r )  in the unofficial economy and a share
is independent of ability so agents’ policy preferences are heterogeneous only in 
ideology as preferences for public good are identical. The indifferent agent in the 
political equilibrium is the agent whose ideological bias makes her indifferent be­
tween voting for A and voting for B given the announced policies. This threshold 
ideological bias in the informal sector is given by:
Therefore candidate A ’s vote share from informal sector agents is the share 
o f informal agents in the population times the probability that these agents have 
an ideological bias q <  ir(gA, gB, 5):
In the formal sector, agents have different preferences over policies depending 
on both ability and ideological heterogeneities. For all such that d (r )  <  cq <  
a +  1, there exists a iF(au t a , gA, r B, gB, 8) such that an agent with ability a t 
and ideology tF is indifferent between A and B. Therefore, the share of formal 
voters voting for candidate A is given by:15
fa + di — 1 +  a  — a ( r )  of agents working officially. In the informal sector, income
¿ V ,  gB, S) =  H( gA) -  H( g3 ) -  5 (4.7)
( H r )  -  a ) Q  +  0 [H(gA) -  H( gB) -  6] ) (4.8)
+ H ( g A) -  H ( g B) -  5)] (4.9)
15See Appendix for derivation.
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Candidate A ’s total vote share is the sum of votes she obtains from each sector. 
Combining (4.8) and (4.9), this is given by:
^ = 2 + ' ((1 +  a )2 -  d (r )2) ( t b  -  t a ) +  (.H(gA) -  H( g B)) -  6 (4.10)
Notice from equation (4.10) that voters in the informal sector vote solely based 
on the level of public good provision and ideology, where as the share of formal 
sector voters choosing politician A depends also on the private idiosyncratic cost 
o f taxation, which is a function of their ability. This is shown in Figure 4.2, which 
is drawn for the case where tb >  rA ■
Figure 4.2: Politicians’ vote share in each sector
Cut-off 
ideological bias
Equation (4.10) can be used to find the politician’s optimal choice of policy.
4.3 Equilibrium policy and sector distribution
In a majoritarian system, A ’s probability of winning, denoted pA, is the pioba- 
bility that tta ^
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pA =  Prob tta >  ~
=  g +  2 ((— X)2 ~ 5'2(r )) (Tb  ~  ta ) + {H (gA) ~  H { g B))




i  ((« + 1)2 -  a2) -  ^ U -a 2)  j is _ i  « 1  + a)2 -  a2) (4.11)
Equation ( l l )16 shows how an increase in tax affects a politician’s probability 
o f winning, by increasing the cost of formality, causing a reallocation of agents to­
wards the informal sector, and a non-monotonic effect on the level of public good. 
The first bracket shows the non-monotonic change in public revenue caused by 
a tax increase: Government revenue increases by the amount of taxable income 
(first term) but total taxable income is reduced (second term) due to taxation 
inefficiencies, which here are due to formal output moving to the informal sector. 
The direction o f the effect will depend on the relative magnitude of these two 
forces. This term is multiplied by the marginal utility of public goods. Finally, 
the last term shows the private cost of taxes to agents in the formal sector.
P r o p o s it io n  4.2  For each ¡i G [a, 1 +  a], there is a unique equilibrium tax rate 
G [0, 1] which is compatible with a positive supply of formal labour. This 
optimal tax rate is a monotonically decreasing function of the relative returns to 
unofficial economic activity p.
P r o o f . Noticing that a  is a function of tax r  and shadow returns /¿, we can write 
the following necessary condition as a function M (r ; p, if, a):
^  =  0 =  AT(r; p, if, a ) 
o t a
which implicitly defines the equilibrium tax rate t  (/i, o ). The second oidei 
condition evaluated at r*(p,  a)  is negative:
Mr <  0 (4.12)
16See Appendix for derivation.
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V fi G [a, a  +  1] implying that there is a unique solution to this problem for 
each exogenous value of [i.
Moreover, evaluating :
r ;  -  <  0 (4.13)
From (12) and (13) we deduce Proposition 4.2. ■
Proposition 4.2 is depicted in Figure 4.3 below, drawn for the case a  =  0. 
The tax rate chosen in equilibrium increases as the quality of institutions im­
proves, that is as /i — a  falls. To understand why, notice that on the one hand 
all voters want a tax rate that maximises redistribution,1' and on the other hand 
those voters operating in the formal sector have a lower bliss point, as they are 
burdened with the tax. The tax rate that maximises public good provision is 
decreasing in à , because as institutional quality weakens formal workers find it 
less profitable to produce formally at each tax rate and so are more likely to move 
to the unofficial sector where they do not contribute to the public good. In the 
limit when ¡i — a  =  1 the public good maximising tax rate is 0. This explains the 
negative relation between tax and informal sector in equilibrium.
Figure 4.3: Equilibrium tax rate as a function of relative returns to informality 








0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
/'




The results of this model are in line with the evidence that governments in 
countries with low enfoicement or poor institutional quality are smaller, imply­
ing that institutional quality and redistribution are complements. Comparative 
statics on the equilibrium using the functional form II (g) =  yjg and varying the 
returns to informality are shown in Figure 4.4, where g  the inverse of institutional 
quality is measured on the horizontal axis.
Figure 4.4. Equilibrium tax rate (blue solid line), informality share (green dashed) 
and public good (yellow dotted) as relative returns to informality increase.
M
The dashed green line represents the equilibrium share of informality in the 
workforce, the solid blue line is the equilibrium tax rate on income and the re­
sulting redistributive public good level is depicted in the dotted yellow line. For 
a given distribution of abilities, the graph shows that the informal sector grows 
and taxation decreases in equilibrium when the quality of institutions worsens 
and relative returns to informality increase accordingly. These comparative stat­
ics support the evidence that countries with large informal sectors tend to have 
lower taxation and smaller governments. This model suggests that this is not only 
due to the constraint informality puts on governments’ fiscal capacity, but also to 
the demand for redistribution from voters in the informal sector interacting with 
the effect that institutional quality has on the elasticity of formality to taxation.
Moreover from this Proposition 4.2 and Remark 4.1 we can deduce the fol­
lowing proposition:
P r o p o s it io n  4 .3  In equilibrium there is always an informal sector fo r  a l l a >  0,
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including when ¡j, =  a.
P r o o f . We know from Proposition 4.2 that the equilibrium tax rate r*(/z, a ) is 
decreasing in ¡1 for all ¡1 G [a, 1 +  a], Moreover, by assumption we have p >  a. 
Hence the highest possible equilibrium tax rate o ) for a given ex is chosen 
when /i =  a. Yet we know that full formality can only prevail in equilibrium, 
ie a  — a , if r* <  1 — Yet if p =  a, this necessary condition is equivalent 
to r* =  0. Hence this implies that the maximum tax rate r*(p,  0 ) for a given 
a  equals zero, so that for all p >  a  we should have t* <  0, which is impossible. ■
Finally, comparative statics are performed on the equilibrium by shifting the 
distribution of abilities. This allows to compare the equilibrium taxation rate 
in countries with different productivity distributions maintaining the quality of 
institutions, hence the relative returns to informality p  — a,  fixed. More interest­
ingly, it also allows to compare the effect of institutional quality on redistribution 
and informality across countries with different productivity distributions, ie. dif­
ferent p  — a.  This exercise involves intractable equations, so I provide the results 
o f a simulation below which give rise to the following Remark 4.2:
R e m a rk  4 .2 As a increases the equilibrium taxation rate r*{p,  a)  falls mono- 
tonically fo r  a fixed level o f institutional quality /Li — a. Moreover, at lower levels of 
a  an improvement in institutional quality leads to a greater rise in the equilibrium 
tax rate and a greater fall in the informality share a  — a.
From Proposition 4.2 we know that the taxation rate chosen in equilibrium 
decreases with p  because as p  increases, the taxation rate at which agents move 
into informality falls for all a. Agents’ preference for the public good drives them 
to reduce the equilibrium tax rate in order to limit the move of producers into the 
informal sector. Moreover, from the above result we know that the taxation rate 
chosen in equilibrium is a decreasing function of a. This is because the marginal 
utility of public good consumption H(.)  is diminishing where as the marginal 
utility of private consumption is constant. Hence the extra productive capacity 
of an economy with higher productivity leads agents’ optimal taxation rate to fall. 
This is what drives the final result of Remark 4.2. As a  rises, agents prefer a lower 
taxation rate, therefore the effect that a rise in /i has on the optimal taxation 
rate (described in Proposition 4.2), which is driven by a desire to minimise the 
move of formal agents into the informal sector, is weakei. Hence diffeiences in
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fi lead to gieater differences in equilibrium taxation rate 7"*(/x) and informality 
share ct(/x, t*) at lower levels of a.
The comparative statics result from Remark 4.2 is derived by simulating the 
model foi different values of fi — a  and varying a. The results of this simulation 
using the same functional form H(g)  =  /̂~g as in Figure 4 and varying a  are 
depicted in Figure 5 below. Note that a rise in a  implies first order stochastic 
dominance in the distribution of abilities. The equilibrium taxation rate obtained 
as the bounds of the ability distribution increase is drawn in the solid dark blue 
line for a relatively weak institutional quality ¡i — a  =  0.3 and in the dashed 
yellow line for a country with higher enforcement fi -  a  =  0.1.
Figure 4.5: Equilibrium tax rate r* for relative informality returns //. — a  =  0.1 
(dashed yellow line) and ¡i — a  =  0.3 (solid blue line) as a  increases
Q
The negative slope of both lines shows that the equilibrium taxation rate is a 
decreasing function of the bounds of the ability distribution, or equivalently that 
a country with labour productivity distribution that stochastically dominates an­
other country’s has lower equilibrium taxation. This is due to the quasi-linearity 
assumption for individual preferences. As the productivity of the workforce in­
creases maintaining the relative returns to informality fixed, both private and 
public good production increase for all tax rates. Yet the utility derived by all 
agents from private consumption rises linearly with a  whilst the marginal utility 
derived from the public good is diminishing, due to the concavity of the prefer­
ences for the public good. Therefore a lower taxation rate equates the marginal 
utility from private and public consumption at higher levels of cr. Moreover, 
whilst /x rises one-for-one with cr by construct, the equilibrium informality rate 
a * - a  =  -H a  rises at a monotonically decreasing rate as r* converges to zero.
  1—7"* ---
More interestingly, the g&p between the two cuives shrinks ss the ability distii-
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bution bounds rise, implying that in countries with a less skilled workforce and 
inferior technology, hence lower labour productivity, differences in institutional 
quality have a greater effect on the equilibrium taxation rate and informality 
share. This is because as productivity rises, the demand for redistribution is 
less salient, hence voters respond to a rise in /i with a smaller reduction in the 
equilibrium taxation rate (as described in Proposition 4.2). This explains why as 
institutional quality improves, taxation increases by more at low levels of produc­
tivity. The importance of improvements in enforcement is greatest for countries 
with low labour productivity.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has drawn a very simple theoretical model that nonetheless endo- 
genises both political and economic choices to explain some stylised facts found in 
cross country data. It is the first probabilistic voting model of its kind, where the 
choice o f sector in a dual economy setting is endogenised and so is the choice of 
policy. Under political competition in a majoritarian system, candidates choose 
an income tax to maximise a utilitarian aggregate welfare function. The equilib­
rium tax monotonically decreases and the informal sector grows with the relative 
returns to informality as determined by the quality of institutions, yielding the 
negative relationship between redistribution and informality found in empirical 
studies. This is due to voters who have a preference for the public good choos­
ing a lower tax rate in countries where the elasticity of formality to taxation is 
higher because of weak institutions and higher relative returns to unofficial activ­
ity. Moreover, the importance of institutions in the relation between taxation and 
informality is decreasing in the overall distribution of productivity. The model 
provides some explanation for the difference in returns to informality between 
countries, namely the interaction of institutional quality with the productivity 
distribution. A large body of research, which is reviewed in the introduction, 
provides complementary explanations for such differences.
The basic model set up in this chapter has promising extensions. In order 
to derive general results, the ideological bias is here assumed to be uniformly 
and independently distributed across groups. It would be interesting to vary the 
political weights in the model to see how distributions of power affect equilibrium 
policy in the presence of an informal sector, or to study othei political economy 
effects o f informality such as its link with corruption. Similarly, the distribution 
o f abilities could be skewed to explore the effects of inequality on informality, as
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in Mishra and Ray (2011). Following their approach, a more explicit modelling 
of enforcement with corruptible inspectors would then provide an interesting ex­
tension to explore the link between corruption and informality, which is salient 
in cross-country data.
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A PPEN D IX  C
C . l  Derivation of (9)
The marginal formal sector voter has ideological bias:
iF =  ( l -  rA)ai -  (1 -  rB)az +  (H( gA) -  H( g B)) -  5
iF =  (tb -  rA)ai +  (H( gA) -  H{ gB)) -  5
Therefore candidate A ’s vote share from the formal sector, the share of for­
mal agents with an ideological bias ti <  lf in the population, depends on the 
distribution of ability in the :
U+a
a ( r )
I








i  ( r )
(H(gA) -  H( gB) -  5) dF (a ,)
itFA =  ( l  +  a -  a (r ) ) i  + <t> ( # ( / )  -  H t f )  -  5)
B +  ° l) 2 -  a 2 { T )
+ < ^ ( r  — r  )
Rearranging yields (9).
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C.2 Derivation of (11)
Noticing that a  is a function of tax and shadow returns, we can write
((1 +  a f  -  d 2(r )) (tb -  rA) +  (H(gA) -  H( g B))
Candidate A  takes B ’s platform as given and proposes a platform that max­
imises her probability of winning the election:
dpA d
drA drA ip ((1 + a )2 - a2(r)) (rB - t a ) +  (H ( g A) - H { g B ) )
Both candidates are identical so the problem is a symmetric one, that is, pA =  1 — 
Pb and candidates both maximise ppR  so they must choose the same platform in a 
rational expectations equilibrium. The equilibrium platform chosen by candidate 
A solves:
1 t t  1 i \2 ~ 2( w  i d H ( g A)
— 2 (T" » + ^ r =  0
where:
dH (gA) _  u
7drA
 ̂((1 +  a )2 -  a 2) - -Q
_2 '' 7 1 -  T
Substituting this expression into the previous equation yields (11). .
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C H A P T ER  5
Conclusion
This thesis compiles three essays on corruption and informality in the devel­
oping world. The first chapter focuses on the industrial organisation effects of 
favouritism in public procurement in the context of Paraguay. It is the first em­
pirical microeconomic study to illustrate the fact that rent-seeking is costly for 
development by showing how entrepreneurs’ economic incentives are distorted 
toward unproductive activities as the result of favouritism in the allocation of 
public contracts in Paraguay. Our findings highlight the importance of tackling 
corruption by shedding light on some of the large dynamic “hidden” costs of 
corruption over and above the static costs of bribery and embezzlement. We 
find that in Paraguay institutions with an important procurement activity are 
more likely to engage in corrupt dealings. As for firms, they have a greater prob­
ability of obtaining a contract directly through an exceptional procedure from 
an institution with which they have a strong contractual relation, both in terms 
of the total value and frequency of transactions, particularly when dealing with 
more corrupt State entities. Finally firms trading more with the public sectoi aie 
found to be more profitable, even when controlling for their unobserved charac­
teristics, reflecting the misallocation of talent towards this largely unproductive 
sector induced by favouritism. Large rents linked to the resale of impoited goods 
to the State and the historical absence of an import-substitution strategy have 
contributed to make Paraguay one of the least industrialised economies in South 
America as, apart from the soybean and meat sectors, its entrepreneurs have 
systematically specialised in commercial intermediation, often with the public
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sectoi as sole client, rather than in production. The costs of this productive 
atiophy and biased specialisation are reflected in the poor record of economic 
growth. Several policy implications emerge from this chapter. First, whilst the 
existence of an exceptional purchase mechanism is clearly needed to deal with 
cases o f emergency, it is also important that a mechanism of checks and balances 
ensure its use remains exceptional. Second, more transparency in the allocation 
of contracts can be achieved by putting together a registry of State providers, in­
cluding the names of the firm owners and members of the administration board. 
Third, the move towards greater transparency also includes better data keeping 
and diffusion. Provided good quality data, an analysis like this one could assess 
the state of competition in public contracts more frequently, which could also 
help to target monitoring efforts. These proposals were put to the Paraguayan 
government in a report which I wrote for Transparency International (Paraguay) 
and presented to the newly elected government in September 2008.
The second chapter analyses the political economy of labour regulatory en­
forcement in Brazil. In the context of the empirical political economy literature 
in Brazil, the analysis reveals that, contrary to other areas of the public sector, 
the work of the labour inspectorate in Brazil is not subject to political manipula­
tion. I test firstly for electoral cycles in the imposition of labour fines, secondly 
whether labour regulations are selectively enforced according to political motiva­
tions and finally, I assess whether “pork barrel” strategies are used in order to 
sway voters. Electoral results are matched with a novel dataset of fines imposed 
on firms for labour infractions to test these considerations. First, the analysis 
finds that mayors’ and the president’s political interests are not significantly cor­
related with the distribution of fines, neither is the alignment of local politicians 
with governors or the president. Second, the appointment of a new governor is 
found to be a highly disruptive event for the inspectorate, as evidenced by the 
steep rise in the number of fines issues in governors’ second term. Third, towns 
where the governor received strong support in the last election have marginally 
fewer fines on average. This corroborates the evidence from the institutional 
analysis of the inspectorate, namely that a key channel foi political influence on 
regulatory enforcement is through the regional inspectorate superintendents who 
are appointed by the state governors. However fourthly, in contrast with Ferraz 
(2007)’s findings in the context of environmental regulations in Brazrl, the pat­
tern o f targeting does not vary significantly along the electoral cycle making it
unlikely to be an electoral clientelism strategy.
The important reforms in the organisation of the labour inspectorate in Brazil
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since the mid-1990s to guarantee more autonomy to the inspectors have probably 
had a positive effect in protecting them from the influence of powerful politicians. 
In this sense, the significant correlation between governors’ political interests and 
the issuance of fines suggests that the appointment of the regional inspectorate 
director should also be kept independent of the political preferences of the gov­
ernor. Nonetheless, the availability of other, more efficient and more effective 
means to sway voters in Brazil suggests that labour inspections are not so much 
at risk of clientelistic manipulation. In fact, fiscal transfers have received far more 
attention in the political economy literature precisely for this reason.
Finally, the fourth chapter builds a voting model in a dual sector economy 
to explain the relation between taxation and informality in cross-country data. 
Voters in countries with high informality rates tend to vote for lower redistribu­
tion and taxation rates. This is explained in the model by the poor quality of 
institutions in such countries, which cause the relative premium from formalising 
to be low. The elasticity of formal production to taxation is therefore lower where 
institutional quality is poor: For a given increase in the tax rate, more individuals 
will hide in the shadow economy. As a consequence, the welfare maximising tax 
rate is found to be lower than in countries where there are more benefits from for­
malising. Moreover, comparative statics on the level of labour productivity show 
that improvements in institutional quality are more important in countries with 
a less productive labour force, as they lead to greater increases in redistribution 
and reductions in the informality share.
The model integrates political mechanisms as well as economic features and in 
doing so shows the non-trivial interaction between informality and policy choice. 
More attention should be paid to this interaction when studying the determinants 
o f informality, instead of taking policy choice as exogenous. Moreover, this chap­
ter contributes a theoretical framework that is well adapted to studying political 
economy features of developing countries, where informality is a key characteristic 
of the economy.
Several projects and ideas for further research have germinated from work on 
this thesis. One in particular focuses on the relationship between informality and 
corruption, which has drawn increasing amounts of research inteiest lately. One 
aspect that has however eluded the literature to date is the impact of informality 
on voting behaviour. In a democratic setting, I argue that widespread informality 
weakens the effectiveness of elections as a mechanism for selecting and disciplin-
iSee for example Friedman ct al. "(2000); Johnson et al. (1998. 1999); Mishra (2005, 2006); 
Mishra and Ray (2011).
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ing politicians, essentially because informal voters receive an imperfect signal 011 
politicians types. This research would contribute to explaining the persistence 
of corruption alongside widespread informality in much of the developing world2.
2See for example Mishra (2006) for an overview of the theoretical explanations to date lor 
the persistence of corruption.
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